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Introduction
One of the central and most fundamental questions in the field of empirical
macroeconomics is which factors explain movements in macroeconomic aggregates
such as output, investment, consumption and inflation. This thesis comprises three
self-contained chapters that each contribute new insights to this field. Chapter 1
examines the role of shocks to consumer misperceptions in explaining macroeconomic
fluctuations. In the backdrop of the European sovereign debt crisis, Chapter 2
investigates whether the co-movement of the fiscal balance and the current account
depends on the indebtedness of the government. Chapter 3 identifies monetary
policy shocks for the United Kingdom (U.K.) based on a narrative methodology and
estimates the effects of monetary policy on the macroeconomy. The remainder of the
introduction provides a more detailed description of each chapter.
Chapter 1. The first chapter estimates the importance of shocks to consumer
misperceptions (“noise shocks”) in explaining U.S. business cycle fluctuations. A
central question that has shaped the area of modern empirical macroeconomics at
least since the studies of Sims (1980) and Kydland and Prescott (1982) is: What
are the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations? Notable contributions building on
these studies are Galí (1999) and Smets and Wouters (2007), who investigate the
role of conventional demand, supply and markup shocks in a new Keynesian model
framework. Beyond these conventional shocks, a number of studies emphasize the
idea of expectation-driven cycles (e.g. Beaudry and Portier, 2004, 2006; Lorenzoni,
2009; Eusepi and Preston, 2011; Angeletos and La’O, 2013). This chapter examines
the role of consumer optimism and pessimism induced by “noise shocks” as a source
for macroeconomic fluctuations relative to other demand and supply shocks. As
1
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noise shocks are not directly observed this chapter proposes an imperfect information
model that is used for structural estimation.
In particular, this chapter embeds imperfect information as in Lorenzoni (2009) into
a Smets and Wouters (2007)-type dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model and estimates the structural model with Bayesian methods. Agents only observe
aggregate productivity and a signal about its permanent component contaminated
with noise. Based on this information agents form beliefs about the temporary and
the permanent component of productivity. Shocks to the signal (“noise shocks”)
trigger aggregate fluctuations unrelated to fundamental changes in productivity.
Noise shocks explain up to 14 percent of output volatility and up to 25 percent of
consumption fluctuations. Counterfactual experiments show that nominal rigidities
and the specification of the monetary policy rule are crucial for the importance of
noise shocks. These features are crucial to resolve conflicting results in previous
literature (see Blanchard, L’Huillier, and Lorenzoni, forthcoming; Barsky and Sims,
2012). Bayesian model comparison cannot sharply distinguish between the incomplete
and the full information model. However, the baseline imperfect information model
is clearly favored compared to a model specification that is closer to Blanchard et al.
(forthcoming), which imposes identical productivity autocorrelation parameters. The
smoothed signal co-moves positively with consumer sentiment data from the Michigan
Survey of Consumer Sentiments.
Chapter 2.1 This chapter examines whether the co-movement of the fiscal
balance and the current account depends on the government debt-to-GDP ratio. The
possible consequences of rising public debt stocks in many European countries have
received much attention in the recent policy debate. In the euro zone the average
government debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 70 percent to 90 percent between
2008 and 2012. Increasing government debt stocks have brought several European
governments to the brink of default and Greece to actually default in 2012. Before
and during the beginning of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 several southern
European countries experienced increasing fiscal deficits and widening current account
imbalances. These observations have rekindled the issue of possible causal linkages of
the fiscal balance to the current account — a debate that has received much attention
since the observation of twin deficits in the U.S. economy in the 1980s. Since 2008-09,
1The work in this chapter has been conducted jointly with Ronald Rühmkorf.
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despite protracted fiscal deficits, the current accounts of southern European countries
have been rebalancing sharply, suggesting that the link between the twin deficits has
diminished. This chapter investigates from an empirical and a theoretical perspective
whether the co-movement of the two balances changes with increasing government
debt.
The first part of the analysis presents the estimation of a dynamic panel threshold
model for 15 European countries to quantify the influence of sovereign indebtedness
on the relationship between the fiscal balance and the current account. One advantage
of this method is that it allows us to estimate a threshold value for sovereign debt
(instead of exogenously imposing a threshold). Below the estimated threshold of 72
percent government debt-to-GDP this study finds a significant, positive relationship
between the fiscal balance and the current account, whereas above the threshold
the partial correlation is insignificant with a point estimate around zero. Splitting
the sample into observations above and below the estimated threshold, this chapter
shows that the correlation of the two balances falls by 0.19 when moving from the low
government debt regime to the high government debt regime. The second part of the
analysis provides a structural explanation for the empirical evidence based on a small
open economy model allowing for the possibility of sovereign default. High government
debt-to-GDP ratios raise non-linear sovereign default risk premia due to the increasing
probability of government default and lead to a higher uncertainty about future taxes.
Therefore, private saving increases while fiscal deficits are expanding, leading to a
less pronounced current account deficit. The model-based correlation of the fiscal
balance and the current account declines by 0.15 when moving from a low government
debt regime to a high government debt regime, which is in line with the empirical
evidence.
Chapter 3.2 This chapter identifies monetary policy shocks based on a new,
extensive real-time forecast data set and estimates the effects of these shocks on the
U.K. macroeconomy. Despite considerable research on the efficacy of monetary policy
a key question in monetary economics still remains: to what extent can monetary
policy affect inflation and real outcomes? The predominant finding of widely applied
structural vector autoregressive (VAR) models is that the peak effect of monetary
policy innovations on prices and output is around 0.5 to 1 per cent. A notable
2The work in this chapter has been conducted jointly with James Cloyne.
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exception is the narrative identification methodology pioneered by Romer and Romer
(2004), which finds effects several times larger than previous studies.3 Despite the
attention given to these findings, there are no other applications of the narrative
methodology. Moreover, much of the literature has focused on the U.S. economy.
This chapter fills both these gaps, providing new narrative-based estimates of the
effects of monetary policy in the U.K. economy.
Chapter 3 argues that the U.K. is an ideal country to conduct the narrative ap-
proach: There is a wealth of real-time and forecast data available and Bank Rate
is the intended policy target rate.4 In employing the Romer–Romer methodology
this chapter constructs a new, extensive real-time forecast database from historical
sources. A first stage regression purges the intended policy target rate of systematic
policy changes to the policymakers’ real-time information set. Based on the new
policy shock series this chapter finds moderate effects of monetary policy on the
macroeconomy: A 100 basis points increase in the policy rate reduces output by
up to 0.6 per cent and inflation by up to 0.8 percentage points after two to three
years. Despite controlling for commodity prizes, oil prizes, and exchange rates a
conventional, recursive VAR with Bank Rate produces a persistent prize puzzle. The
methodology employed in this chapter resolves the prize puzzle of the U.K. and shows
that forecasts are crucial for this result. In addition, Chapter 3 provides a range
of robustness checks, among these alternative timing assumptions, single equation
regressions, different forecast sources, and sub-samples.
Despite addressing three distinct research questions, each of the three chapters in
this thesis aims to shed new light on key issues in the field of empirical macroeconomics.
In particular, they examine the role of noise shocks as a driver of the business cycle
(Chapter 1), the influence of government indebtedness on the co-movement of the
fiscal balance and the current account (Chapter 2) and the narrative identification of
monetary policy shocks and its effect on macroeconomic aggregates such as output
an inflation (Chapter 3).
3This approach follows earlier work using a slightly different narrative identification strategy in
Romer and Romer (1989).
4For the U.S. Romer and Romer (2004) first need to construct an intended policy target series
from historical documents as the federal funds rate is a market rate.
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Consumer misperceptions, uncertain
fundamentals, and the business cycle
1.1 Introduction
The notion that consumer optimism or pessimism can cause business cycle fluc-
tuations has a long tradition in economics. It dates back at least to Pigou (1927),
who believed that “errors of undue optimism or undue pessimism in their business
forecasts” caused industrial fluctuations, and Keynes (1936), who assigned a large
role to “animal spirits” in explaining business cycle fluctuations. A number of studies
revive the idea of expectation-driven cycles (e.g. Beaudry and Portier, 2004, 2006;
Eusepi and Preston, 2011; Angeletos and La’O, 2013). Among these, Lorenzoni (2009)
presents a calibrated model where noise shocks or “animal spirit” shocks induce
business cycle fluctuations.1 Noise shocks induce fluctuations in consumers’ beliefs
unrelated to fundamental changes, generating positive co-movement in consumption,
output, employment and inflation.
This chapter provides new empirical evidence on the importance of noise shocks as a
driving force of the U.S. business cycle and compares the fit to the perfect information
model. Imperfect information as in Lorenzoni (2009) is embedded in a new Keyne-
sian model with price and wage rigidity, investment adjustment costs and variable
capital utilization building on the models of Smets and Wouters (2007), Justiniano,
Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010), and Fernández-Villaverde (2010). Consumers are
rational and passively learn about the fundamentals of the economy by observing
noisy signals.2 Specifically, agents learn about the temporary and the permanent
1Lorenzoni (2009) calibrates the signal to generate as much demand-side volatility as possible.
2A large literature focuses on different variants of learning, among these rational inattention (e.g.
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component of productivity by only observing aggregate productivity and a signal
about permanent productivity contaminated with noise. Shocks to the signal (“noise
shocks”) affect consumers’ perception about unobserved productivity components
triggering aggregate fluctuations.3 The main results are: Noise shocks account for 14
percent of output fluctuations and 25 percent of consumption fluctuations on impact.
After twelve quarters, they still explain ten percent of output and twelve percent of
consumption fluctuations.
Blanchard, L’Huillier, and Lorenzoni (forthcoming) show that the consumers’
signal extraction problem implies a non-fundamental vector autoregressive (VAR)
representation rendering it impossible to identify noise shocks in a VAR. The filtering
problem and the identification of noise shocks require the estimation of a structural
model. Building on their contribution I employ Bayesian methods to estimate a
medium-scale imperfect information new Keynesian model with several shocks using
U.S. data. Based on these estimates it takes consumers about eight quarters to
disentangle pure noise from fundamental shocks. Furthermore, smoothed estimates of
the signal fit remarkably well to data from the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Survey.
Counterfactual experiments show that nominal rigidities and the specification of
the Taylor rule crucially affect the importance of noise shocks – a finding that also
helps to reconcile conflicting results on the importance of noise shocks as I discuss
later. A positive noise shock triggers a perceived wealth effect as consumers mistake
noise for an increase in permanent productivity. The higher is the price stickiness, the
stronger the response of aggregate demand. Wage stickiness substantially increases
consumption fluctuations even in the presence of moderate price stickiness: Sticky
wages imply that firms rationally anticipate reduced fluctuations in their real marginal
costs. Hence, inflation variability decreases as compared to the flexible wage case. Less
variation in inflation reduces the responsiveness of the real interest rate through the
Fisher equation and therefore reduces consumers’ willingness to postpone consumption
to later periods. Thus, due to a weaker intertemporal substitution effect, households
increase consumption more under sticky wages than under flexible wages. In addition,
the less responsive the central bank sets interest rates to inflation and real activity,
Makowiak and Wiederholt, 2009) and least-squares learning (e.g. Eusepi and Preston, 2011). In
the present chapter learning means that rational agents form beliefs about unobserved state
variables.
3The model features a variety of conventional supply, demand and markup shocks.
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the stronger are the effects of noise shocks through less variation in the real interest
rate.
This chapter also compares the fit of the incomplete information model with the
model where consumers perfectly observe the state of the economy using marginal
likelihoods. The resulting Bayes factor is too small to sharply discriminate between
both models. This chapter also estimates the imperfect information model assuming
identical autocorrelation parameters for the temporary and permanent productivity
process as in Blanchard et al. (forthcoming). The joint dynamics of the data are
better matched in the model, allowing for different autocorrelation parameters as
measured by the Bayes factor. It is noteworthy that the estimation of the restricted
case yields a very high degree of nominal rigidity and small Taylor rule coefficients.
In line with my counterfactual analysis these estimates contribute to a much stronger
effect of noise shocks on real activity.
Closely related empirical literature does not agree on the importance of noise shocks
finding that these shocks explain between zero and 75 percent of short-run fluctuations
in consumption. The model framework in this chapter nests the specifications in
Blanchard et al. (forthcoming) and Barsky and Sims (2012) allowing to identify the
factors that drive the importance of noise shocks. Blanchard et al. (forthcoming)
employ a maximum likelihood estimation of a highly stylized new Keynesian model
with noise shocks. They find that 75 percent of consumption fluctuations on impact
and still more than 50 percent after four quarters are due to noise shocks, while
productivity shocks account for the remaining fraction. However, their estimation
yields virtually fixed prices running counter to microeconomic evidence on price
adjustments (e.g. Bils and Klenow, 2004) and macroeconomic evidence from estimated
DSGE models (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007). In an extended new Keynesian model
similar to the one employed in this chapter (but with identical autocorrelation
parameters for temporary and permanent productivity and without price and wage
indexation) they find that noise shocks explain more than 50 percent of consumption
fluctuations on impact and about 25 percent after two years. Noise shocks account
for a large fraction of cyclical fluctuations due to high degrees of nominal rigidity
and a very low responsiveness to inflation and output of the interest rate rule.4 By
4Estimates for the average price and wage duration are close to two years and the Taylor rule
coefficient on inflation is virtually one.
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impulse response function matching Barsky and Sims (2012) estimate a DSGE model
featuring price rigidity, habit formation, and capital adjustment costs, finding that
noise shocks explain virtually no aggregate fluctuations due to general equilibrium
effects. Based on counterfactual analysis this chapter confirms that for intermediate
degrees of price rigidity and flexible wages noise shocks do not explain a large fraction
of consumption volatility, but in combination with wage rigidity noise shocks do
account for a sizable fraction of business cycle fluctuations.
Noise-driven business cycles as presented in this chapter crucially differ from
the literature on news-driven business cycle models (e.g. Jaimovich and Rebelo,
2009; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2012). In their frameworks agents have more
information than in the imperfect information setup considered in this work as they
perfectly observe current and future productivity (“news”) shocks.5 In addition to
the aforementioned studies this chapter is also related to Milani (2007) and Eusepi
and Preston (2011). These papers provide a learning mechanism where agents deviate
from the rational expectations assumption in that agents learn about parameters
of the model from historical data. The focus of this work is instead to analyze
an incomplete information model which gives rise to a channel leading agents to
temporarily deviate from the complete information model equilibrium. Thus, within
an imperfect information model, noise shocks generate business cycle fluctuations in
a full rational expectations framework.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 1.2 provides the model, formalizes
the imperfect information environment and outlines the solution method. Section 1.3
shows the estimation strategy and results. This section also conducts prior predictive
analysis and Bayesian model comparisons. Section 1.4 presents impulse response
functions and performs forecast error variance decompositions. Section 1.5 provides a
sensitivity analysis based on counterfactual experiments. Section 1.6 provides the
conclusion.
5In principle, information about future changes may be offset by a new observation in the next
period, e.g. a positive news shock to be realized in three periods from today may be offset in
period two. As news shocks are typically assumed to be i.i.d., systematic/correlated erroneous
beliefs cannot arise.
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1.2 The model
This section provides a concise overview of the model which builds on the new
Keynesian frameworks of Smets and Wouters (2007), Justiniano et al. (2010) and
Fernández-Villaverde (2010). The core elements of the model are relatively standard
and therefore this section presents a non-technical description of the model. In
addition, the imperfect information setup and the solution method to the imperfect
information model are introduced.
1.2.1 Model overview
The model economy is structured as follows: A continuum of households each offers
differentiated labor services to intermediate firms, a continuum of monopolistically
competitive intermediate goods firms and perfectly competitive final good firms that
bundle the intermediate goods. The model is closed by a monetary authority that
implements an interest rate feedback rule responding to inflation and output growth.
Price and wage rigidity is introduced via a Calvo (1983)-mechanism. Prices and wages
that cannot be adjusted follow an indexation rule. Households maximize an additively-
separable utility function with habits in consumption and they rent the capital stock
to firms subject to variable capital utilization and investment adjustment costs. In
addition to noise shocks the model features the following structural shocks: temporary
and permanent neutral total factor productivity (TFP), investment-specific TFP,
monetary policy, price and wage markup shocks. A detailed outline and derivation of
the model economy is provided in Appendix 1.A.
To introduce and formalize the imperfect information setup the production function
of intermediate goods is presented. A continuum of monopolistically competitive
firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] each produces a differentiated good, Yt(i), using the same
technology
Yt(i) = AtKαt (i)Nt(i)1−α − φzprofitst , (1.1)
where the fixed cost of production is φ. Kt(i) and Nt(i) are, respectively, the firm’s
capital and labor input. The aggregate level of technology is given by At = XtZt,
where Xt denotes the permanent and Zt is the temporary component. The growth
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rate of the permanent component follows an AR(1) process, which implies that the
level Xt builds up gradually over time in response to a shock. The stochastic processes
are:
Xt
Xt−1
=
(
Xt−1
Xt−2
)ρx
exp(x,t) , x,t ∼ N (0, σ2x) (1.2)
Zt = Zρzt−1 exp(z,t) , z,t ∼ N (0, σ2z) . (1.3)
A conventional assumption in the DSGE literature (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007)
is that rational agents perfectly observe all states and shocks of the economy. This
chapter relaxes the assumption that agents perfectly observe the entire state and
instead considers a model of passive learning.6 Agents behave fully rational given
their information sets. Following Lorenzoni (2009) agents only observe aggregate
productivity At, but neither the exact realization of its permanent nor its temporary
component. In addition, consumers observe a noisy signal about the permanent
component
St = Xt exp(s,t) , s,t ∼ N (0, σ2s) , (1.4)
where σs measures the precision of the signal. A shock to the signal is defined as
a noise shock. The signal conveys information that helps consumers to infer the
actual level of permanent productivity. The additional information comprises, for
example, consumer sentiment studies, financial market prices, or sector statistics
of the economy. How exactly consumers form beliefs about unobserved variables is
addressed in Section 1.2.3.
1.2.2 Linearization
The model features a unit root in productivity At and thus, consumption, invest-
ment, capital, real wages and output fluctuate around a stochastic non-stationary
balanced growth path. Therefore, the model is expressed in terms of detrended
6The present chapter assumes that agents learn passively, whereas in models of rational inattention
agents learn actively as agents dynamically choose which variables they observe subject to an
information capacity restriction (e.g. Sims, 2003; Makowiak and Wiederholt, 2009). The setup
is also different from least-squares learning (e.g. Milani, 2007; Eusepi and Preston, 2011) that
relaxes the rational expectations assumption.
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variables denoted with a ‘hat’, e.g. Yˆt = Yt/At.7 A complete list of all detrended
first-order conditions can be found in Appendix 1.A.6. Using standard methods,
I log-linearize the detrended first-order conditions around the zero price and wage
inflation steady state. Henceforth, lower case variables denote log-linear deviations
from their steady state.
Aggregate productivity equals the sum of permanent and temporary productivity:
µˆAt = xˆt + zt . (1.5)
The permanent and temporary productivity component are, respectively, given by:
xˆt = ρxxˆt−1 − ρxxˆt−2 − zt−1 + ρxµˆAt−2 + x,t , x,t ∼ N (0, σ2x) (1.6)
zt = ρzzt−1 + z,t , z,t ∼ N (0, σ2z) . (1.7)
For identical autocorrelation coefficients ρx = ρz the variances of both shocks are
linearly dependent under the assumption:
ρxσ
2
x = (1− ρx)2σ2z ≡ σ2A , (1.8)
where σ2A denotes the variance of aggregate productivity growth µˆAt . The noisy signal
sˆt is correlated with permanent productivity:
sˆt = xˆt + s,t , s,t ∼ N (0, σ2s) . (1.9)
1.2.3 Information structure
Consumers imperfectly observe the state of the economy and are exposed to non-
fundamental noise shocks.8 Agents observe aggregate productivity and a noisy signal
about the permanent component of productivity. The signal represents additional
information that improves the consumers’ estimate about the true permanent pro-
ductivity. A noise shock, s,t, affects private sector beliefs about components of
productivity and induces consumers to temporarily over- or underestimate the actual
7The variables At, Xt and St are detrended with lagged productivity At−1. The growth rate of
TFP is denoted by µAt = At/At−1.
8Noise shocks are non-fundamental in the sense that they do not actually change productivity.
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productivity of the economy triggering perceived wealth effects.
The information structure captures the notion that agents form erroneous beliefs
about unobserved fundamentals of the economy and thereby generate short-run
fluctuations. Having observed aggregate productivity and the signal, consumers
update their beliefs about the permanent and the temporary component via the
Kalman filter. As the system of equations is linear and all shocks are Gaussian, using
the Kalman filter implies that consumers process information in the most efficient
way (see Hamilton, 1994, Chapter 13).
Consumers’ beliefs about the unobserved variables follow the law of motion (see
Appendix 1.B for a detailed derivation):

xˆt|t
xˆt−1|t
zt|t
µˆAt−1|t−1
 = A

xˆt−1|t−1
xˆt−2|t−1
zt−1|t−1
µˆAt−2|t−2
+B
 µˆAt
sˆt
 . (1.10)
To clarify notation, xˆt−1|t denotes the consumers’ belief about the unobserved state
xˆt−1 at time t or equivalently xˆt−1|t = Et [xˆt−1|It], where It denotes the consumers’
information set comprising all observables up to period t.9 Solving the filtering
problem numerically yields the elements of matrix A and B which are non-linear
functions of the parameters ρx, ρz, σx, σz and σs. The elements of matrix A indicate
how much past beliefs affect contemporaneous beliefs. The coefficients in matrix B
indicate how much weight consumers give to each observable.
Noise shocks provide interesting dynamics as the shock size interacts non-linearly
with its contribution to business cycle fluctuations. At intermediate values of the
signal precision agents place some weight on the signal and thus will respond to this
information. For imprecise signals (large σs) agents place very little weight on the
information they convey. In contrast, perfectly observed structural shocks in the
model will cause larger effects on macroeconomics variables the higher the standard
deviation of each shock.
9Lagged productivity growth µˆAt−1|t−1 is perfectly observed; however the variable is needed to
derive the detrended process for the permanent productivity component xˆt|t.
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1.2.4 Solution method
Solving DSGE models where agents receive noisy information and learn about un-
observed state variables necessitates an adjustment of conventional solution methods.
Using conventional solution methods for rational expectations models (see Klein,
2000; Sims, 2002) the full-information log-linearized model is solved by a first-order
approximation around the steady state. All agents’ behavior is fully rational given
their information set. This behavior implies agents optimally form expectations about
unobserved states from the set of observables by employing the Kalman filter to
solve the signal extraction problem. In the linearized model equilibrium certainty-
equivalence applies.10 Consequently agents behave as if the optimal forecast of an
unobserved state is the true state variable. Hence, consumers’ beliefs, (xˆt|t, xˆt−1|t, zt|t),
about the unobserved state variables subsequently replace the respective actual state
variables in the log-linearized state space representation under perfect information.
Baxter, Graham, and Wright (2011) provide a general overview of solution methods
for rational expectation models with various informational frictions.
To illustrate the solution procedure more clearly the full-information model solution
in state space representation is given by
X1,t = ΠX2,t−1 , (1.11)
X2,t = MX2,t−1 + R˜t , (1.12)
where X1,t is the vector of control variables, X2,t contains all state variables and R˜ is
a matrix that scales the shock vector t. The matrices M and Π map lagged state
variables to contemporaneous state variables and to control variables, respectively.
To solve the imperfect information model the unobserved states are then replaced by
their estimated counterparts such that the control variables X1,t are a linear function
of the estimated, unobserved states, i.e.
X1,t = ΠX2,t−1|t−1 , (1.13)
where, importantly, the coefficients of the policy function, Π, are identical to those
10The literature often explores linearized models of imperfect information (e.g. Lorenzoni, 2009;
Nimark, 2013) rather than solving a fully non-linear imperfect information model.
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obtained in the complete-information solution. Appendix 1.C provides further details
on the solution method.
1.3 Estimation methodology
To address the central question how much noise shocks contribute to U.S. business
cycle fluctuations I estimate the model using Bayesian methods and compute variance
decompositions. A full information structural estimation technique is required to avoid
identification problems that arise due to the consumers’ signal extraction problem.
Blanchard et al. (forthcoming) show that if agents face a signal extraction problem
as considered in the present chapter, the DSGE model exhibits a non-invertible VAR
representation in the observables, i.e. there exists no mapping from the reduced
form residuals into the structural shocks of the model. Given that the model is not
invertible one cannot identify the structural shocks via any identification scheme
in a structural VAR. However, these authors as well as Leeper, Walker, and Yang
(2009) show that it is possible to use a full-information estimation approach such as
maximum likelihood or Bayesian methods in order to identify the structural shocks.
This chapter pursues the latter approach and uses prior information about certain
parameter values.
First, a prior predictive analysis demonstrates that noise shocks are likely to explain
a moderate fraction of consumption and output growth fluctuations, but much less of
investment volatility. Second, the results of the posterior distributions are presented.
Third, this section compares the fit of various model specifications employing Bayesian
model comparison techniques.
1.3.1 Data
The model is estimated using six quarterly U.S. time series for the sample period
1970:1 to 2011:4. The data series are log differences in consumption, investment, real
wages, productivity, inflation, and the effective federal funds rate.11 The steady state
growth rate of TFP is set to unity and accordingly all variables prior to estimation
11The data sources and the construction of the series in the observation equation are reported in
Table 1.6 and Table 1.7 of Appendix 1.D.
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are demeaned. The observation equation relates the observed data to the respective
counterparts in the model:
Yt =

∆ log (Ct)
∆ log (It)
∆ log (Wt)
∆ log (At)
∆ log (GDPDEFt)
FFRt

=

cˆt − cˆt−1 + aˆt−1
iˆt − iˆt−1 + aˆt−1
wˆrt − wˆrt−1 + aˆt−1
aˆt − aˆt−1
pit
rt

. (1.14)
In addition to many likelihood-based estimation studies of DSGE models the
observation equation includes neutral TFP growth. The real-time productivity series
of Kimball, Fernald, and Basu (2006) is the best available TFP measure as it is
adjusted for variations in factor utilization. In particular the series facilitates the
estimation of the productivity process parameters, which affect how long consumers
take to disentangle actual changes in productivity from pure noise shocks.12
1.3.2 Fixed parameters
Prior to estimation a set of parameters is fixed (see Table 1.1). The discount
factor β is set to 0.99 as the model is matched to quarterly frequency. The fixed cost
of production φ is matched to maintain zero profits in steady state. Productivity
growth is set to unity (µA = 1) as the model is matched to demeaned data. Capital
depreciation is 2.5 percent per quarter. The steady state price and wage markup are
each set to 12.5 percent.
1.3.3 Prior distributions
Prior distributions are in line with those commonly employed in the literature
(see Smets and Wouters, 2007; Justiniano et al., 2010; Fernández-Villaverde, 2010).
Table 1.3 displays an overview of the prior choices. Prior means are set to match
12Adding output growth would require to add measurement error as the resource constraint would
otherwise postulate a linear relationship in the observables (see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2012).
For this reason the model is estimated without output growth.
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Table 1.1: Parameters fixed prior to estimation
Parameter Value Description/Target
β 0.99 Stochastic discount factor
ϑ 8 Steady state labor hours: 0.35
u 1 Steady state capital capacity utilization
φ 0.045 Zero profits in steady state
µA 1 Growth rate of productivity
δ 0.025 Annual depreciation rate of 10%
ηp 9 Steady state price markup of 12.5%
ηw 9 Steady state wage markup of 12.5%
estimates from previous studies and the standard errors are selected to cover a wide
range of values including those of previous estimates.
The price and wage stickiness parameter are drawn from a beta distribution with
a prior mean value that implies an average price and wage duration of 3 quarters
and a standard deviation of 0.1. According to the terminology in Del Negro and
Schorfheide (2008), who perform a detailed analysis of choosing prior distributions
for these two parameters, the prior mean is in the middle of their categories agnostic
and high rigidities. Price and wage indexation also follow a beta distribution with
mean 0.7 and standard deviation 0.1. For the Taylor rule coefficients on inflation
I select a normal distribution with mean 1.4 and standard deviation 0.125 and on
output growth a mean and standard deviation of 0.1.
Autocorrelation parameters follow a diffuse beta distribution which is naturally
bounded on the unit interval. Concerning the prior assumption for the standard
errors of the structural shocks, I assume an inverse gamma distribution which has
positive support with mean 1 and a standard deviation of 5, except for permanent
productivity where I choose a smaller mean of 0.5. This choice is motivated by the
observation that small shocks to the permanent component induce large level effects.
The prior mean for the precision of the signal is 1 percent — a value that also covers
the range of estimates in Blanchard et al. (forthcoming). The remaining parameters
are drawn from prior distributions comparable to those selected in Smets and Wouters
(2007), Justiniano et al. (2010) and Fernández-Villaverde (2010).
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1.3.4 Prior predictive analysis
A prior predictive analysis is used to assess how strongly structural shocks affect
business cycle fluctuations and in particular to show that consumption and output
dynamics are not a priori driven by noise shocks. This method is used to verify the
importance of each structural shock in generating business cycle fluctuations based
on the theoretical model given the specified priors, before confronting the model with
actual data.
Simulating the prior predictive of a model has been employed recently by Leeper,
Traum, and Walker (2011) to compare variants of DSGE models in generating fiscal
multipliers. In the same spirit the range of variance decompositions implied by
the model and the priors is explored. The ex-ante predictive distribution for the
observables is
p(y) =
∫
Θ
p(θ)p(y|θ)dθ , (1.15)
where p(θ) is the prior distribution and p(y|θ) is the model distribution. The prior
distribution of observables p(y) is simulated by drawing from θ(m), and y(m) ∼ p(y|θ(m))
for m = 1, .., 50000. Based on simulated values of observables the vector of interest
ω, i.e. the forecast error variance decomposition p(ω|y, θ), is computed.
To provide a fair comparison and to be consistent with the empirical DSGE
literature the standard deviations for all shocks are drawn from the same prior
distribution except for the permanent productivity shock which has a smaller mean
for the reasons discussed before.13 Table 1.2 presents the results. Noise shocks
explain between zero and ten percent of consumption as well as of output fluctuation
and very little of investment growth volatility. Monetary policy and TFP shocks
explain the largest fraction of consumption, investment, output and wage fluctuations.
Wage markup shocks virtually do not account for business cycle fluctuations as their
shock size is relatively small (compared to the estimated value as is shown later).
Price markup shocks mostly drive wage and output growth volatility. As expected,
investment-specific TFP shocks mostly account for investment dynamics. How much
each structural shock actually contributes to the business cycle crucially depends on
13Studies that use identical prior distributions for each shock are for example Rabanal and Rubio-
Ramírez (2005); Smets and Wouters (2007); Fernández-Villaverde (2010); Leeper et al. (2010);
Justiniano et al. (2010).
17
Chapter 1
Table 1.2: Prior predictive probability distribution: variance decomposition
Temp. Perm. Invest.-spec. Monetary Price Wage Noise
TFP TFP TFP policy markup markup
Consumption growth
Quarters
1 14.2 [1.0,36.8] 46.1 [3.3,92.2] 0.1 [0,0.2] 30.2 [0.4,92.3] 5.2 [0,26.8] 0.1 [0,0.2] 4.0 [0.1,9.8]
4 8.8 [0.8,22.1] 58.7 [7.0,93.2] 0.1 [0,0.3] 24.4 [0.2,88.1] 3.9 [0,18.9] 0.1 [0,0.1] 4.0 [0.2,9.2]
12 8.6 [0.8,21.5] 58.4 [6.6,93.2] 0.3 [0,0.7] 24.9 [0.2,88.6] 4.1 [0,20.1] 0.1 [0,0.1] 3.8 [0.2,9.0]
Investment growth
Quarters
1 12.4 [0.6,32.7] 32.3 [0.9,82.7] 11.9 [0.1,59.2] 31.6 [0.6,92.6] 9.7 [0.1,49.5] 0.3 [0,0.6] 1.9 [0,6.4]
4 6.4 [0.5,14.6] 52.5 [3.5,91.5] 10.2 [0.1,52.8] 23.2 [0.2,86.2] 6.3 [0.0,33.3] 0.2 [0,0.4] 1.2 [0,3.2]
12 4.9 [0.5,11.9] 58.6 [5.8,93.8] 8.7 [0.1,45.7] 21.1 [0.2,83.6] 5.6 [0.0,29.3] 0.2 [0,0.3] 0.9 [0,2.3]
Output growth
Quarters
1 12.9 [0.8,34.7] 42.9 [2.6,91.3] 2.7 [0,13.0] 31.0 [0.5,92.4] 6.7 [0,35.3] 0.1 [0,0.3] 3.7 [0.1,9.5]
4 7.8 [0.7,19.7] 57.2 [6.3,92.7] 2.0 [0,8.6] 24.6 [0.3,87.7] 4.9 [0,25.0] 0.1 [0,0.2] 3.5 [0.1,8.5]
12 7.4 [0.7,18.7] 57.6 [6.2,92.8] 1.8 [0,7.9] 24.8 [0.3,88.1] 5.0 [0,25.9] 0.1 [0,0.2] 3.3 [0.1,8.1]
Wage growth
Quarters
1 19.8 [2.1,40.0] 43.2 [ 3.8,84.1] 0.4 [0,1.0] 4.8 [0,27.7] 29.4 [0.5,90.0] 0.4 [0,1.1] 2.1 [0,6.6]
4 8.5 [1.4,16.8] 67.3 [13.1,93.8] 0.3 [0,0.7] 3.6 [0,19.6] 19.0 [0.2,78.2] 0.2 [0,0.5] 1.1 [0,2.9]
12 6.4 [1.4,14.1] 73.2 [18.0,96.2] 0.4 [0,1.0] 3.4 [0,18.6] 15.7 [0.1,71.6] 0.2 [0,0.4] 0.8 [0,2.0]
Notes: The table reports mean values with 5 and 95 percentiles in brackets.
the estimated standard deviation of the shock.
The importance of noise shocks changes non-linearly with the precision of the
signal, as agents put more or less weight on its reliability to be informative about the
true fundamentals of the economy. For all other shocks in the model it holds that
the higher the standard deviation the stronger the effect of the shock. The range
of the 5 and 95 percentile is relatively tight for noise shocks (it ranges from zero to
ten percent for consumption fluctuations on impact) and covers a larger range for
permanent TFP, monetary policy and price markup shocks.14 Choosing prior means
14The estimated standard deviation of monetary policy shocks is one fourth smaller and for markup
shocks it is substantially higher such that their relative importance in a variance decomposition
of the model simulated at the posterior mean is different from the findings based on a prior
predictive analysis.
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for the standard deviations closer to those in the estimated model yields stronger
noise-driven business cycles. A priori the model is flexible in the dimension that noise
shocks can in principle account for various amounts of business cycle fluctuations.
The next section estimates the model and presents variance decompositions based on
actual U.S. post-war data.
1.3.5 Posterior distributions
Following the steps in An and Schorfheide (2007) and Fernández-Villaverde (2010)
I estimate the vector of parameters Θ using Bayesian methods. Denote the ob-
served data series by {Yt}Tt=1. Using the Kalman filter I obtain the likehood
L
(
{Yt}Tt=1|Θ
)
from the state space representation of the model. The posterior
distribution p
(
Θ|{Yt}Tt=1
)
is proportional to the likelihood times the prior p (Θ):
p
(
Θ|{Yt}Tt=1
)
∝ L
(
{Yt}Tt=1|Θ
)
p (Θ) . (1.16)
Since no closed-form solution for the posterior distribution exists, I resort to
numerical methods. The Chris Sims optimization routine is employed to compute
the posterior mode and the Hessian evaluated at the posterior mode. Given the
posterior mode, I use the random-walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to sample from
the posterior density. The scale parameter for the jumping distribution is chosen to
match an average acceptance rate of 31 percent. Two chains with 750, 000 draws each
are generated of which the last 150, 000 draws of each chain are used to compute
posterior statistics, which were sufficient to obtain convergence of the MCMC chains.
Further diagnostics and prior versus posterior plots are reported in Appendix 1.F.15
Table 1.3 reports the estimated means of the posterior distribution and the 5
and 95 percentiles.16 The posterior mean value for the precision of noise shocks is
0.31%, indicating a much higher signal precision than the estimate in Blanchard
et al. (forthcoming). Their estimate is five times larger (σs = 1.47%) and lies outside
the 5 and 95 percentile of the posterior distribution of this study. Nonetheless the
15This appendix also includes the fit of the observables to actual data and check plots for the
maximization of the posterior mode. In addition the identification checks of Iskrev (2010) confirm
that given the vector of observables all parameters are identifiable at the prior mean.
16The estimation is carried out in an adapted code of Dynare 4.3.3. to incorporate the solution
method as described in Section 1.2.4.
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estimated signal precision in this study remains sufficiently noisy indicating substantial
misperceptions of consumers about the true underlying productivity processes. Calvo
parameter estimates imply an average price and wage duration of ten and three
quarters, respectively. Previous literature provides estimates for price stickiness
typically ranging from 0.66 to 0.87 and for wage stickiness around 0.68 to 0.70 (see
Smets and Wouters, 2007; Justiniano et al., 2010; Fernández-Villaverde, 2010). The
Taylor rule coefficient for inflation is 1.14 and for output growth the estimate is 0.21.
The persistence of nominal interest rates is 0.8. The estimated Taylor rule coefficients
are very similar to previous estimates in the literature (e.g. Fernández-Villaverde,
2010).
The autocorrelation parameter of the productivity processes, ρx = 0.97, implies
that the permanent component increases gradually and the temporary component
decreases slowly (ρz = 0.92). As expected, the standard deviation for permanent
productivity is much smaller than for temporary productivity (σx = 0.15% and
σz = 0.77%). In line with Smets and Wouters (2007) the standard deviation for
the wage markup shock is relatively large. This finding has triggered an extensive
literature about what accounts for the finding that wage markup shocks explain about
50% of real GDP fluctuations.17
The remaining parameters for habits in consumption, adjustment costs in investment
and utilization costs are close to previous estimates. The capital share α = 0.1 is
below the estimate of other papers, among these Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti
(2013) find α = 0.16. The inverse Frisch elasticity of ϕ = 1.18 is comparable with
preceding findings in the literature (e.g. Fernández-Villaverde, 2010).
17Justiniano et al. (2013) use two different measures of wage inflation and estimate a medium-
scale model with measurement error in wages growth to account for high frequency movements
in the series and find that this strongly reduces the variation in worker’s quarter-on-quarter
monopoly power. Wage markup shocks are observationally equivalent to labor supply shocks (not
included in the model) and therefore difficult to interpret (see also the discussion in Chari et al.,
2009). The work by Galí, Smets, and Wouters (2011) extends the model to include involuntary
unemployment, which overcomes the identification problem outlined in Chari et al. (2009) when
using unemployment data. In order to keep the model tractable and to trace out the importance
of noise shocks relative to other shocks – be it preference or markup shocks – the inclusion of
unemployment is left for further research.
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Table 1.3: Prior and posterior distribution of incomplete information model
Prior Posterior
Parameter Description Distr. Mean Std Mean 5% 95%
hc Habit persistence B 0.6 0.1 0.82 0.78 0.85
κ Investment adj. costs N 6 2 8.99 6.68 11.27
α Capital share B 0.3 0.1 0.10 0.05 0.14
ϕ Inverse Frisch elasticity G 2 0.75 1.18 0.42 1.90
δ2 Capital utilization costs N 0.2 0.1 0.13 0.05 0.21
θp Price stickiness B 0.7 0.1 0.90 0.87 0.93
θw Wage stickiness B 0.7 0.1 0.66 0.55 0.79
χp Price indexation B 0.7 0.2 0.81 0.67 0.96
χw Wage indexation B 0.7 0.2 0.59 0.37 0.83
γdy Taylor rule: output growth N 0.1 0.1 0.21 0.08 0.33
γpi Taylor rule: inflation N 1.4 0.125 1.14 1.04 1.24
γR Interest rate smoothing B 0.7 0.1 0.80 0.77 0.83
ρis Inv.-specific TFP B 0.8 0.1 0.66 0.55 0.77
ρx Perm. neutral TFP B 0.8 0.1 0.97 0.95 0.99
ρz Temp. neutral TFP B 0.8 0.1 0.92 0.89 0.95
ρp Price markup B 0.7 0.1 0.55 0.38 0.74
ρw Wage markup B 0.7 0.1 0.92 0.88 0.97
ρplag Lagged price markup B 0.5 0.1 0.49 0.39 0.60
ρwlag Lagged wage markup B 0.5 0.1 0.58 0.48 0.67
100σs Noise shock IG 1 5 0.31 0.2 0.41
100σx Perm. TFP IG 0.5 5 0.15 0.11 0.19
100σz Temp. TFP IG 1 5 0.77 0.7 0.84
100σm Monetary policy IG 1 5 0.26 0.24 0.28
100σis Investment-spec. TFP IG 1 5 9.46 6.37 12.63
100σp Price markup IG 1 5 3.34 2.32 4.32
100σw Wage markup IG 1 5 13.28 4.44 24.17
Notes: The estimated incomplete information modelM1. B is beta distribution, G is gamma
distribution, IG is inverse gamma distribution, N is normal distribution.
1.3.6 Model comparisons
Bayesian estimation techniques are well-suited to compare various model spec-
ifications (see Fernández-Villaverde and Francisco Rubio-Ramirez, 2004; An and
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Schorfheide, 2007). Previous results of this chapter were based on the assumption
that agents in the economy imperfectly observe the state of the economy. The imper-
fect information modelM1 is compared to the model with perfect informationM2,
i.e. the permanent and the temporary productivity process are perfectly observed and,
hence, the signal is superfluous. A meaningful comparison of marginal likelihoods
requires the estimation with the same vector of observables for each model. For this
reason the precision of the signal is set to zero (σs = 0), such that the signal perfectly
reveals the true state of the economy.
The posterior odds ratio is the product of the prior odds ratio times the marginal
likelihoods of both modelsM1 andM2:
p
(
M1|{Yt}Tt=1
)
p (M2|{Yt}Tt=1)
= p(M1)
p(M2)
p
(
{Yt}Tt=1|M1
)
p ({Yt}Tt=1|M2)
. (1.17)
The ratio of the marginal likelihoods, the Bayes factor, is used to compare the fit of
models. The Bayes factor takes into account the number of estimated parameters
and, thus, favors a parsimonious model specification.
The marginal likelihood for the imperfect information model is -922.1 and that for
the perfect information model is -916.2. Hence, the model with perfect information
is e5.9 times more likely to be the data generating process than the model with
imperfect information. On grounds of the Bayes factor it is difficult to judge this as
decisive evidence in favor of the complete information model. Marginal likelihoods
are very sensitive to small changes in the model specification and typically the
differences in the marginal likelihoods are much larger. For example, Rabanal and
Rubio-Ramírez (2005) and An and Schorfheide (2007) compare various specifications
of a new Keynesian model and interpret a Bayes factor of the magnitude e5 not as
conclusive evidence as it is too small.
To ensure better comparability to previous literature I estimate the imperfect
information model under the assumption that ρx ≡ ρz (M3).18 Comparing the
restricted imperfect information model to the one that allows for different coefficients
in the productivity processes I find that the unrestricted model explains the data much
better. The Bayes factor implies that the baseline specification is e58.7 times more
likely than the special case with identical parameters for the productivity processes.
18The estimation results are shown in Appendix 1.E.
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Table 1.4: Log marginal densities
Specification p
(
{Yt}Tt=1|Mi
)
Bayes factor
Imperfect info modelM1 -922.1 1
Perfect info modelM2 -916.2 exp(5.9)
Imperf. info model (ρx = ρz)M3 -981.2 exp(58.7)
Notes: The marginal density of the data conditional of the model is computed with the modified
harmonic mean estimation as defined by Geweke (1999).
The restricted model forces ρx ≡ ρz(= 0.95) and the estimated signal is less precise
as σs increases from 0.31% to 0.51%. It is noteworthy that the estimated Taylor
rule parameters change substantially: The inflation coefficient is at the bound to
the indeterminacy region (γpi = 1.001) and the reaction to output growth becomes
weaker (γdy = 0.08). In fact, these estimates are very similar to Blanchard et al.
(forthcoming) who assume that ρx = ρz and who find (γpi = 1.01 and γy = 0.02)
that noise shocks account for a much higher fraction of consumption and output
fluctuations. Later, Section 1.5 investigates the sensitivity of noise shock induced
business cycles for various specifications of the Taylor rule and nominal rigidities.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Impulse responses
Figure 1.1 depicts the impulse response functions to a one standard deviation
noise shock with parameter values at their posterior mean together with 90 percent
confidence bands. The upper left panel shows the evolution of beliefs about permanent
(xt|t) and temporary (zt|t) productivity. When a positive noise shock materializes,
consumers believe that permanent productivity has increased. However, as they have
not yet observed a change in aggregate productivity, they believe that a negative
temporary productivity shock offsets the permanent shock. It takes about eight
quarters until agents have learned that the productive capacity of the economy has
actually not changed. The signal shock itself is not persistent, but the beliefs about
the unobserved states are erroneous for a few quarters as it takes time until consumers
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have disentangled fundamental shocks from noise shocks.
The perceived wealth effect induced by noise shocks increases consumption, in-
vestment and output like a conventional demand shock. To clear the labor market
hours worked increase and real wages temporarily rise. Monetary policy reduces
inflationary pressures by increasing interest rates. Nominal rigidities and the Taylor
rule affect the real interest rate response and, thus, crucially affect the strength of
the intertemporal substitution effect.
Figure 1.1: Impulse responses to a noise shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation noise shock with parameters at their
posterior mean value. Dashed gray lines indicate 90 percent confidence bands. All variables are
measured in percentage deviations from steady state (x-axis). A time unit is a quarter (y-axis).
The dynamics after an expansionary monetary policy shock are similar to those
induced by a noise shock as both are demand shocks (see Figure 1.4 in Appendix 1.E).
Importantly, both shocks are not observationally equivalent, which would complicate
the identification of shocks. Two crucial differences emerge: First, noise shocks cause
strong hump-shapes and macroeconomic variables overshoot a few quarters after the
shock. Second, a positive noise shock induces an economic expansion accompanied by
an increase in the nominal interest rate to reduce inflation, whereas a surprise increase
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in the nominal interest rate decreases demand and, therefore, has contractionary
effects on the observed variables. These differences in the conditional moments ensure
that both shocks are separately identified in the estimation.
1.4.2 Business cycle contribution of noise shocks
The forecast error variance decomposition evaluates the quantitative importance
of noise shocks relative to conventional sources such as supply, demand, and markup
shocks in explaining business cycles. Table 1.5 reports the conditional forecast error
variance decomposition for output, consumption, investment and wage growth. Noise
shocks explain 25 percent of consumption growth fluctuations on impact and still
account for about 15 percent after four quarters and 12 percent in the longer term.19
Eventually wage markup and permanent productivity shocks explain the highest
fraction of consumption volatility. As noise shocks do not fundamentally change
macroeconomic conditions and rational agents learn the true nature of shocks roughly
within two years, it is natural that the importance of noise shocks vanishes over time.
Nonetheless, noise shocks account for substantial short-term dynamics. Monetary
policy shocks virtually do not affect consumption and output growth. The latter
is mostly driven by neutral and investment-specific TFP shocks as well as by wage
markup shocks in consensus with Smets and Wouters (2007). The impact effect of
noise shocks on output growth is 14 percent and around 10 percent at the four to
twelve quarter horizon. Wage growth is mainly driven by both markup shocks.
Justiniano et al. (2010) estimate a similar new Keynesian model with perfect
information finding that preference shocks explain more than 50 percent of consump-
tion fluctuations. Preference shocks affect the economy via the intertemporal Euler
equation. Noise shocks have similar features but offer a different interpretation about
business cycle episodes. While ad-hoc preference shocks are difficult to interpret,
noise shocks emerge naturally in a model of imperfect information and square well
with the notion that consumer sentiments partially drive cyclical fluctuations. In line
with my findings neutral TFP shocks are the second most important driver of con-
sumption fluctuations in their study. More than 60 percent of output fluctuations are
19As noted earlier the precision of the signal interacts non-linearly with the shock size. Noise shocks
explain the largest fraction of consumption fluctuations at intermediate degrees of the signal
precision (see Figure 1.5 in Appendix 1.E).
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Table 1.5: Forecast error variance decomposition
Temp. Perm. Invest.-spec. Monetary Price Wage Noise
TFP TFP TFP policy markup markup
Consumption growth
Quarters
1 9.6 9.1 0.2 6.6 7.4 42.4 24.9
4 5.2 47.8 0.2 4.0 4.0 23.3 15.5
12 3.9 58.0 0.2 3.4 3.5 18.8 12.1
Investment growth
Quarters
1 0.9 0.4 84.9 2.4 4.4 6.2 0.7
4 1.3 2.9 80.0 2.7 4.1 8.0 0.9
12 1.6 3.4 77.8 2.7 4.1 9.5 0.8
Output growth
Quarters
1 4.9 5.1 38.7 5.0 6.7 25.5 14.2
4 3.8 35.0 21.8 4.0 4.7 19.2 11.5
12 3.1 44.4 17.7 3.7 4.4 17.1 9.6
Wage growth
Quarters
1 1.7 2.3 0.2 1.0 24.4 63.6 6.8
4 1.7 24.1 0.4 1.1 18.6 47.1 6.9
12 1.5 36.9 0.4 1.0 15.4 39.1 5.7
Notes: Forecast error variance decomposition with parameter values at posterior mean.
driven by neutral and investment-specific TFP shocks, also comparable to Justiniano
et al. (2010) who report 75 percent. Investment fluctuations are mainly driven by
investment-specific TFP shocks and price markup shocks. They find more than 80
percent is accounted for by investment-specific shocks as compared to 78 percent for
a twelve quarter horizon in the present study. Finally, in accordance with Justiniano
et al. (2010) price and wage markup shocks explain the bulk of variation in wage
growth.
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1.4.3 Business cycle episodes of consumers’ signal
The noisy signal in the model is correlated with trend productivity to capture that
consumers and firms typically have more information about the state of the economy
than only aggregate productivity data. To draw a retroperspective history of U.S.
business cycles smoothed estimates of the signal are backed out based on the Kalman
filter. Figure 1.2 shows the smoothed signal in comparison with consumer survey
data from the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Survey. The following observations
stand out: The smoothed signal and consumer expectations co-move positively (the
correlation is 0.24). During most of the NBER recessions consumer sentiment and
the signal simultaneously decline. The smoothed signal and consumer sentiment
are relatively low during the productivity decline in the 1970s. The drop in trend
productivity growth that was recognized in the early 2000s is reflected in a substantial
decline in both series. Finally, the Great Recession is exactly matched by a fall in
the smoothed signal.
Figure 1.2: Smoothed signal and consumer sentiment data
Notes: Smoothed signal based on Kalman filter and Michigan Consumer Sentiment Survey:
business conditions expected during the next five years. Grey areas indicate NBER recessions.
The left y-axis is measured in percentage deviations from steady state. The right y-axis is
normalized to 100.
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The signal process is not a priori modeled to match with actual consumer survey
data. Against this background the smoothed signal fits remarkably well to consumer
sentiment data. However, the modeling as to how exactly consumers form beliefs to
map survey data into the model is left for future research.
1.5 Robustness
This section builds up further intuition regarding the propagation of noise shocks
and assesses their role in driving macroeconomic fluctuations. The higher the degree
of price and wage rigidity, the stronger the effect of noise shocks. In addition, the
weaker nominal interest rates react to inflation and output growth the more do
noise shocks affect real macroeconomic variables. Finally, the findings are related to
those from previous literature showing which factors cause the (seemingly) conflicting
results of Blanchard et al. (forthcoming) and Barsky and Sims (2012).
1.5.1 Interaction of nominal rigidities and noise shocks
Counterfactual experiments explore the importance of noise shocks in interaction
with price and wage rigidity. Based on these experiments this section reports variance
decompositions of noise shocks based on parameter values at their posterior mean for
different degrees of nominal rigidity and various Taylor rule coefficients.
The left panel of Figure 1.3 reports the fraction of consumption fluctuations
accounted for by noise shocks across all admissible values of price and wage rigidity.20
First, consider the extreme case of fixed prices (θp = 1) while keeping wages flexible.
The consumers’ Euler equation plays the key role in the transmission of noise shocks.
In this fixed price case, inflation does not change and thus the only source of
movements in the nominal interest rate is through output changes. Consequently,
the real interest rate response is muted, which implies almost perfect consumption
smoothing.21 Hence, if prices are fixed, quantities fully adjust to the temporary
wealth effect inducing a strong response in consumption, investment and output (by
20The estimated values for price and wage stickiness are 0.90 and 0.66, respectively, which implies
that noise shocks account for 25 percent of consumption fluctuations.
21In the fixed-price model the intertemporal substitution effect is very small; for γdy = 0 the channel
is shut off and thus the model turns into a partial equilibrium model as the intertemporal price,
i.e. the real interest rate, is constant.
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the full amount of expected long-run movement in productivity). In this case noise
shocks explain almost 60 percent of consumption volatility.
Allowing for sticky prices strengthens the intertemporal substitution effect which
substantially alters the importance of noise shocks in explaining business cycles.
Setting the frequency of price adjustment to an average price duration of 2.5 to
5 quarters (θp ∈ [0.6, 0.8]), mutes the propagation of noise shocks with regard to
consumption as compared to the fixed price case. As inflation and consequently the
nominal interest rate increases, the real interest rate also rises. Thus, consumers prefer
to postpone consumption to later periods, but eventually learn that the fundamentals
of the economy have actually not changed leading to a weaker response in consumption
and in output.
Adding nominal wage rigidity revives the role of noise shocks in explaining consump-
tion volatility as compared to flexible wages. Figure 1.3 illustrates that the higher is
wage stickiness the more do noise shocks account for consumption fluctuations. The
driving force is that sticky wages dampen the effect on real marginal costs, which leads
to less variability in inflation. Thus the intertemporal substitution effect is smaller
the more rigid are wages leading to a stronger consumption increase. Hence, sticky
nominal wages amplify the role of noise shocks as a driving force of consumption and
output fluctuations. The extreme case of fixed prices and fixed wages implies that
noise shocks account for close to 70 percent of consumption fluctuations.
1.5.2 Interaction of Taylor rule and noise shocks
The responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to inflation and output growth also
crucially changes the transmission of noise shocks on consumption and output. In
the same spirit as before I vary the inflation coefficient on the interval γpi ∈ [1.01, 2]
as well as the coefficient on output growth γdy ∈ [0, 1]. The fraction of consumption
fluctuations accounted for by different specifications of the monetary policy rule are
presented in the right panel of Figure 1.3. The main result is that the importance of
noise shocks relative to all other structural shocks increases substantially the closer
the inflation coefficient is to unity and the smaller the output growth coefficient. The
reason is that the stronger the response to inflation, the more does the real interest
rate increase. Thus, consumers will postpone consumption to future periods, but
then observe no actual fundamental productivity increases in later periods. Even for
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Figure 1.3: Interaction of nominal rigidities and monetary policy rule with noise
shocks
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Notes: Fraction of impact consumption volatility attributed to noise shocks with parameters at
posterior mean and where price and wage stickiness (left panel) and the Taylor rule coefficients
on inflation and output growth (right panel) are varied. The axis for the inflation coefficient is
reversed.
very low inflation coefficients (γpi = 1.01) noise shocks might still not substantially
contribute to consumption volatility if interest rates were to respond strongly to
output (γdy ≥ 0.5). Large coefficients on output growth will again raise the real
interest rate providing a channel that leads agents to postpone consumption. If noise
shocks were a major driver of the business cycle and the central bank wanted to mute
consumption volatility, it should respond in particular to output fluctuations and
react strongly to inflation.
1.5.3 Comparison to previous literature
The sensitivity analysis helps to reconcile the broad range of results regarding the
importance of noise shocks found in previous literature. Blanchard et al. (forthcoming)
find that noise shocks explain up to 75 percent of consumption fluctuations in a basic
new Keynesian model with virtually fixed prices — a finding that is also confirmed
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in the extended new Keynesian model in this chapter (with fixed prices). In contrast,
Barsky and Sims (2012) find that noise shocks do not contribute to consumption
and output fluctuations. Without wage rigidity and at intermediate degrees of price
stickiness as in the model of Barsky and Sims (2012) I also find that noise shocks play
a negligible role in contributing to business cycle fluctuations. Both models disregard
wage rigidity, which substantially amplifies the transmission of noise shocks as I show
in the robustness analysis. The estimation in this chapter finds that U.S. data square
well with a noisy signal and intermediate values of price and wage stickiness, implying
that noise shocks explain a sizeable fraction of U.S. business cycles.
In their DSGE exercise Blanchard et al. (forthcoming) estimate that noise shocks
explain up to 50 percent of consumption fluctuations, double the size as compared
to the results of this chapter. These authors find that interest rates respond very
mildly to output (γy = 0.02) and to inflation (γpi = 1.01). Their estimated Calvo
parameters imply average price and wage durations of about eight quarters. The
parameter values of high rigidity and low responsiveness of monetary policy generate
much stronger effects of noise shocks as shown in the previous robustness section.
Estimating the imperfect information model that forces the autocorrelation param-
eter for the temporary and the permanent productivity process to be identical yields
estimates (ρx = 0.95, θp = 0.92, θw = 0.79, γy = 0.08 and γpi = 1.001) that are closer
to Blanchard et al. (forthcoming), who impose this assumption. Jointly estimating
the precision of the signal, nominal rigdities and the interest rate rule in combination
with a flexible structure for the productivity processes (ρx 6= ρz) provides a general
framework capable of accounting for a broad range for outcomes of noise-driven
business cycles. The formal model comparison in Section 1.3.6 reveals that the model
with different productivity parameters provides a much better fit to explain the joint
behavior of U.S. data than the model that imposes identical productivity parameters.
1.6 Conclusion
Large-scale DSGE models such as Smets and Wouters (2007) widely applied by
central bankers and policymakers typically feature structural shocks that induce
fundamental changes in the economy. This chapter contributes to the literature
providing new empirical evidence on the importance of noise shocks in generating
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cyclical fluctuations in an estimated new Keynesian model. The model framework
nests all of the frictions employed in previous empirical literature (i.e. Blanchard
et al., forthcoming; Barsky and Sims, 2012) and adds a more flexible structure for
the productivity processes. Noise shocks contribute to 25 percent of consumption
fluctuations and 14 percent of output volatility on impact. These findings are about
half the size than those documented in Blanchard et al. (forthcoming).
Nominal frictions and the Taylor rule play a crucial role in determining the impor-
tance of noise shocks for consumption fluctuations. Sticky prices and wages dampen
the response in the real interest rate such that consumption increases strongly in
response to a noise shock. Additionally, the weaker the central bank’s reaction to
inflation and output growth the stronger the real effects of noise shocks. Counterfac-
tual experiments confirm the result in Barsky and Sims (2012) that for intermediate
degrees of price stickiness and flexible wages noise shocks explain virtually no con-
sumption fluctuations. For high degrees of nominal rigidities and very low Taylor rule
coefficients noise shocks explain more than 50 percent of consumption fluctuations in
line with Blanchard et al. (forthcoming).
Bayesian model comparison reveals that the complete and incomplete information
explain the joint behavior of U.S. data almost equally well - rendering it impossible
to empirically prefer one model over the other. However, the model with different
persistence parameters for the temporary and the permanent productivity component
is clearly favored to the model with identical persistence parameters for both processes.
The smoothed signal fits remarkably well to consumer survey data. Further research
aiming to align consumer sentiment studies and heterogeneous beliefs with DSGE
models is likely to prove very interesting. In particular using real-time consumer
sentiment data to facilitate the estimation of DSGE models would be an interesting
avenue for further research.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
1.A Model appendix
The core of the model builds on conventional medium-scale DSGE models such
as Smets and Wouters (2007), Justiniano et al. (2010) and Fernández-Villaverde
(2010).22
1.A.1 Households
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of households indexed by h ∈ [0, 1].
Preferences are additively separable in consumption and labor supply
U(Ct(h), Nt(h)) = log (Ct(h)− hcCt−1(h))− ϑNt(h)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ , (1.18)
where Ct(h) denotes household h’s consumption and Nt(h) the amount of hours
worked. The parameter hc denotes habit persistence in consumption, ϑ determines
labor supply in steady state and ϕ is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
Each household h supplies a different type of labor Nt(h) and has some monopoly
power in the labor market, posting the nominal wage Wt(h) at which it is willing to
supply specialized labor services to firms that demand them (see Erceg, Henderson,
and Levin, 2000). Households have access to a complete set of state-contingent
Arrow-Debreu securities to fully insure against idiosyncratic income risk that derives
from the limited ability to adjust wages in each period.23 Let Dt+1(h) denote the
payoff in period t+ 1 of the portfolio of state-contingent securities held by household
h at the end of period t and let Qt,t+1 denote the stochastic discount factor. The
budget constraint of household h is given by
PtCt(h) + PtIt(h) + Et {Qt,t+1Dt+1(h)} −Dt(h) (1.19)
= Wt(h)Nt(h) +
(
Rkt ut(h)−
1
µISt
Pta(ut(h))
)
Kt−1(h) + Tt(h) + Υt(h) , (1.20)
22An excellent textbook treatment of the new Keynesian framework is Galí (2008).
23With complete markets, consumption and the marginal utility of consumption are equalized across
households and states at all times in equilibrium (given identical endowments).
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where It(h) is investment, Kt(h) is the capital stock, Tt(h) are lump-sum payments and
Υt(h) are the profits of firms. The utilization rate of capital, ut(h), transforms physical
capital into effective capital rented to firms at real rate rkt . The cost of physical
capital utilization is a quadratic function a(ut(h)) = δ1(ut(h)− 1) + δ22 (ut(h)− 1)2
where in steady state, u = 1, a(1) = 0 with curvature a′′(1)
a′(1) =
δ2
δ1
. Households own and
invest in capital facing investment adjustment costs as in Christiano et al. (2005).
The law of motion for capital is:
Kt(h) = (1− δ)Kt−1(h) + µISt
(
1− S
(
It
It−1
))
It(h) . (1.21)
Investment adjustment costs are specified as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005): S(It/It−1) = κ2
(
It
It−1
− µI
)2
which are introduced to dampen the volatility of
investment over the business cycle. The parameter κ ≥ 0 measures the curvature of
investment adjustment costs and µI is the long-run growth rate of investment. In
steady state it holds that S = S ′ = 0 and S ′′ > 0. The exogenous investment-specific
technological shock µISt measures the variation in the efficiency at which the final
good can be transformed into physical capital and follows an AR(1) process:
log
(
µISt
)
= ρis log
(
µISt−1
)
+ is,t is,t ∼ N (0, σ2is) . (1.22)
A representative household h maximizes the expected discounted lifetime utility
with respect to Ct(h), ut(h), Kt(h), It(h),Wt(h), Nt(h) and Dt+1(h) subject to the
budget constraint (1.19) and a standard no-Ponzi scheme condition. Households
have identical first-order conditions as consumers have access to complete financial
markets where they insure their idiosyncratic income risk.
1.A.2 Optimal wage setting
Differentiated labor services are bundled to a homogeneous labor good Nt according
to a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
Nt =
[∫ 1
0
Nt(h)
ηw,t−1
ηw,t dh
] ηw,t
ηw,t−1
, (1.23)
34
1.A Model appendix
where ηw,t denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution across different varieties
of labor types. The time-varying gross markup µw,t = ηw,tηw,t−1 follows an exogenous
ARMA(1,1) process
log
(
µw,t
µw
)
= ρw log
(
µw,t−1
µw
)
+ w,t − ρwlagw,t−1 , w,t ∼ N (0, σ2w) , (1.24)
where w,t is a wage markup shock. The optimal bundling of differentiated labor
services based on cost minimization yields the labor demand schedule:
Nt(h) =
(
Wt(h)
Wt
)−ηw,t
Nt . (1.25)
The aggregate wage index Wt is a composite of all labor type specific wage rates:
Wt =
[∫ 1
0
Wt(h)1−ηw,tdh
] 1
1−ηw,t
. (1.26)
The fraction (1− θw) of households can adjust their posted nominal wage. Wage
inflation and infrequent wage adjustments induce relative wage distortions that
facilitate an inefficient allocation of labor. Each period optimizing households choose
their wage W ?t (h) = Wt(h) for their labor type in order to maximize the expected
discounted lifetime utility subject to the labor demand schedule. The wage of the
remaining fraction of households θw is indexed to past inflation. A household that is
not allowed to change wages for τ periods has a normalized wage of ∏τs=1 Πχwt+s−1Πt+s Wt(h),
where the indexation parameter is χw ∈ [0, 1]. The relevant terms of the optimization
problem are:
max
W ?t (h)
Et
∞∑
τ=0
(βθw)τ
[
−ϑNt+τ (h)
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ + λt+τ
τ∏
s=1
Πχwt+s−1
Πt+s
Wt(h)
Pt+τ
Nt+τ (h)
]
s.t. (1.27)
Nt+τ (h) =
(
τ∏
s=1
Πχwt+s−1
Πt+s
Wt(h)
Wt
)−ηwt+τ
Nt+τ . (1.28)
Given the assumption of complete markets (assuming identical initial conditions)
and separable utility in labor (see Erceg et al., 2000), I consider a symmetric equi-
librium where Ct(h) = Ct, λt(h) = λt, ut(h) = ut, Kt(h) = Kt, It(h) = It and
W ?t (h) = W ?t .
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1.A.3 Final good producers
Perfectly competitive final good producers bundle intermediate goods Yt(i) to a
final good Yt following a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregation technology:
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt(i)
ηp,t−1
ηp,t di
] ηp,t
ηp,t−1
. (1.29)
The time-varying intratemporal elasticity of substitution across different varieties of
consumption goods is denoted ηp,t. The time-varying gross price markup µp,t = ηp,tηp,t−1
follows an exogenous ARMA(1,1) stochastic process
log
(
µp,t
µp
)
= ρp log
(
µp,t−1
µp
)
+ p,t − ρplagp,t−1 , p,t ∼ N (0, σ2p) , (1.30)
where p,t is a price markup shock. Profit maximization yields the input demand
schedule for intermediate goods:
Yt(i) =
(
Pt(i)
Pt
)−ηp,t
Y dt . (1.31)
The minimum costs of a bundle of intermediate goods that provides one unit of
composite good amounts to the aggregate price index:
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt(i)1−ηp,tdi
] 1
1−ηp,t
. (1.32)
1.A.4 Intermediate goods producers
A continuum of monopolistically competitive firms is indexed by i ∈ [0, 1], where
each firm produces a differentiated good using the same technology
Yt(i) = AtKαt (i)Nt(i)1−α − φzprofitst , (1.33)
where the fixed cost of production is φ. The aggregate level of technology is At = XtZt,
where Xt and Zt denote the permanent and the temporary component, respectively.
The growth rate of the permanent component follows an AR(1) process, which implies
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that the level Xt builds up gradually over time. The stochastic processes are:
Xt
Xt−1
=
(
Xt−1
Xt−2
)ρx
exp(x,t) , x,t ∼ N (0, σ2x) (1.34)
Zt = Zρzt−1 exp(z,t) , z,t ∼ N (0, σ2z) . (1.35)
In addition, consumers observe a noisy signal about the permanent component
St = Xt exp(s,t) , s,t ∼ N (0, σ2s) , (1.36)
where σs measures the signal precision and s,t is a noise shock.
Firms set prices in a staggered fashion a` la Calvo (1983), i.e. firms can re-optimize
prices with probability (1 − θp) each period and, therefore, take into account that
they may not be able to adjust prices in the next period. Prices of those firms that
cannot change prices are indexed to past inflation for which the degree of indexation
is governed by χp ∈ [0, 1]. Firms set prices P ? = P (i) to maximize expected profits
subject to the demand schedule (1.31)
max
P ?t
Et
∞∑
τ=0
θτpQt,t+τYt+τ (i)
(
τ∏
s=1
Πχpt+s−1
Pt(i)
Pt+τ
−MCt+τ (i)
)
s.t. (1.37)
Yt+τ (i) =
(
τ∏
s=1
Πχpt+s−1
Pt(i)
Pt+τ
)−ηpt
Y dt+τ , (1.38)
where Qt,t+s is the households’ stochastic discount factor as defined before andMCt(i)
is firm i’s real marginal cost.
1.A.5 Monetary policy and aggregation
The central bank operates a Taylor rule where the nominal interest rate Rt responds
to changes in inflation and output growth as well as the lagged interest rate
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)γR (ΠtΠ
)γpi 
ydt
ydt−1
µy

γdy
1−γR
exp(m,t) , m,t ∼ N (0, σ2m) .(1.39)
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Aggregate demand in the economy is:
Y dt = Ct + It +
(
µISt
)−1
a(ut)Kt−1 . (1.40)
1.A.6 Detrended model equilibrium conditions
λˆt =
(
Cˆt − hcCˆt−1 1
µAt
)−1
− βhcEt
(
Cˆt+1µ
A
t+1 − hcCˆt
)−1
(1.41)
λˆt = βEt
λˆt+1
µAt+1
Rt
pit+1
(1.42)
qkt µ
A
t+1 = βEt
λˆt+1
λˆt
(
(1− δ)qkt+1 + rkt+1ut+1
)
(1.43)
− βEt λˆt+1
λˆt
1
µISt+1
(
δ1(ut+1 − 1) + δ22 (ut+1 − 1)
2
)
(1.44)
1 = qkt µISt
1− κ2
(
Iˆt
Iˆt−1
µAt − µI
)2
− κ
(
Iˆt
Iˆt−1
µAt − µI
)
Iˆt
Iˆt−1
µAt
 (1.45)
+ βEtqkt+1
λˆt+1
λˆt
1
µAt+1
µISt+1κ
(
Iˆt+1
Iˆt
µAt+1 − µI
)(
Iˆt
Iˆt−1
µAt
)2
(1.46)
rkt =
1
µISt
(δ1 + δ2 (ut − 1))
g1t = λˆtmctyˆdt + βθpEt
(
Πχpt
Πt+1
)−ηp,t+1
g1t+1 (1.47)
g2t = λˆtΠ∗t yˆdt + βθpEt
(
Πχpt
Πt+1
)1−ηp,t+1 Π∗t
Π∗t+1
g2t+1 (1.48)
ηp,tg
1
t = (ηp,t − 1) g2t (1.49)
ft =
η − 1
η
(
Wˆ ∗t
)1−ηw,t
λˆt
(
Wˆt
)ηw,t
ldt (1.50)
+ βθwEt
(
Πχwt
Πt+1
)1−ηw,t+1(Wˆ ∗t+1
Wˆ ∗t
µAt+1
)ηw,t+1−1
ft+1 (1.51)
ft = ϑ
(
Wˆt
Wˆ ∗t
)ηw,t(1+ϕ)(
ldt
)1+ϕ
(1.52)
+ βθwEt
(
Πχwt
Πt+1
)−ηw,t+1(1+ϕ)(Wˆ ∗t+1
Wˆ ∗t
µAt+1
)ηw,t+1(1+ϕ)
ft+1 (1.53)
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utkˆt−1
ldt
= α1− α
wˆt
rkt
µAt (1.54)
mct =
( 1
1− α
)1−α( 1
α
)α
wˆ1−αt
(
rkt
)α
(1.55)
1 = θp
(
Πχpt−1
Πt
)1−ηp,t
+ (1− θp) (Π∗t )1−ηp,t (1.56)
1 = θw
(
Πχwt−1
Πt
)1−ηw,t(wˆt−1
wˆt
1
µAt
)1−ηw,t
+ (1− θw) (Π∗wt )1−ηw,t (1.57)
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)γR(ΠtΠ
)γΠ
yˆdt
yˆdt−1
µAt
µy

γY
1−γR
exp (εm,t) (1.58)
yˆdt =
(
µAt
)−α(
utkˆt−1
)α(
ldt
)1−α − φ
υpt
(1.59)
yˆdt = cˆt + Iˆt +
(
µISt
)−1 (
δ1 (ut − 1) + δ22 (ut − 1)
2
)
kˆt−1
(
µAt
)−1
(1.60)
lt = υwt ldt (1.61)
υpt = θp
(
Πχpt−1
Πt
)−ηp,t
υpt−1 + (1− θp) (Π∗t )−ηp,t (1.62)
υwt = θw
(
Πχwt−1
Πt
)−ηw,t(wˆt−1
wˆt
1
µAt
)−ηw,t
υwt−1 + (1− θw) (Π∗wt )−ηw,t (1.63)
0 = kˆt − (1− δ) kˆt−1 1
µAt
− µISt
1− κ2
(
Iˆt
Iˆt−1
µAt − µI
)2 Iˆt (1.64)
Exogenous processes are specified in the main text and in Appendix 1.A.
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1.B Consumers’ Kalman filter
Define the matrices:
C =

ρx −ρx −1 ρx
1 0 0 0
0 0 ρz 0
1 0 1 0
 ,Σ1 =

σ2x 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 σ2z 0
0 0 0 0

D =
 1 0 1 0
1 0 0 0
 ,Σ2 =
 0 0
0 σ2s
 .
The process for ξt =
(
xˆt, xˆt−1, zt, µˆAt−1
)
is described compactly as
ξt = Cξt−1 +Rt , (1.65)
and the observation equation for consumers is
yt =
(
µˆAt , sˆt
)′
= Dξt + St , (1.66)
where yt is the vector of observables, t contains all structural shocks, Et [Rt′tR′] = Σ1
and Et [St′tS ′] = Σ2. Let P = Vart−1 [ξt]. The value of P is found by solving the
following equation:
P = C
[
P − PD′(DPD′ + Σ2)−1DP
]
C ′ + Σ1. (1.67)
According to the updating equation of a linear projection (see Hamilton (1994),
equation 13.2.15) the evolution of the unobserved state is:
ξt|t = ξt|t−1 + PD(DPD′ + Σ2)−1(yt −Dξt|t−1) (1.68)
= (I −BD)ξt|t−1 + PD(DPD′ + Σ2)−1yt (1.69)
= Aξt−1|t−1 +BDCξt−1 +B(DR + S)t . (1.70)
The last step uses ξt|t−1 = Cξt−1|t−1, B = PD(DPD′ + Σ2)−1 and A = (I −BD)C.
Equation (1.10) in the main text follows the notation based on matrices A and B.
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1.C Model solution
The solution to the full information log-linearized model can be obtained using
standard methods, e.g. Klein (2000). The vector of control variables is X1,t and the
vector of state variables is denoted by X2,t. The full information model solution is
given in recursive form by the policy (Π) and transition (M) function respectively
X1,t = ΠX2,t−1 , (1.71)
X2,t = MX2,t−1 + R˜t , (1.72)
where X2,t =
[
xˆt xˆt−1 zt Xobst
]′
, t = [x,t z,t s,t m,t p,t w,t is,t]′, and Xobst
is the vector of observed states. Introducing imperfect information necessitates
an adjustment of solution methods as proposed in Baxter et al. (2011). Agents
cannot directly observe the components of productivity, i.e. xˆt and zt. Define the
vector of unobserved states as ξt =
[
xˆt xˆt−1 zt µˆAt−1
]′
, which is a subset of all state
variables X2,t.24 Agents form contemporaneous estimates about the states, i.e. ξt|t,
stemming from solving the Kalman filtering problem (Appendix 1.B contains a
detailed derivation). The following system describes the evolution of the actual states
and the beliefs of the agents ξt
ξt|t
 =
 N11 0
N21 N22
 ξt−1
ξt−1|t−1
+
 R
B(DR + S)
 t ,
where N11 = C. Solving the consumers’ Kalman filtering problem yields a recursive
solution for the contemporaneous beliefs (see equation (1.70)), i.e.
ξt|t = Aξt−1|t−1 +Byt = Aξt−1|t−1 +BDCξt−1 +B(DR + S)t , (1.73)
such that N21 = BC and N22 = A. The matrices A,B,C and D were already
introduced in the filtering problem described in Appendix 1.B. Given the contempo-
raneous estimates about the unobserved states ξt−1|t−1 and the linearity of the model,
24Note that µˆAt−1 is perfectly observed, but it is required to pin down xˆt.
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certainty equivalence25 applies (see Baxter et al., 2011) and hence
X1,t = ΠX2,t−1|t−1 , (1.74)
where X2,t−1|t−1 =
[
ξt−1|t−1 xobsi,t−1
]′
and xobsi,t−1 represents all observable lagged state
variables.26
25Certainty equivalence implies that even though consumers know that they imperfectly observe the
fundamentals of the economy, their decisions are as if they knew the true value of the unobserved
state variable (i.e. under full information).
26For example, Pearlman et al. (1986), Pearlman (1992), Svensson and Woodford (2004) and
Lorenzoni (2009) also use certainty equivalence in a linear model with partial information.
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1.D Data appendix
Table 1.6: Data sources
Label Description Source
GDP Gross domestic product BEA (Table 1.1.5, Line 1)
GDPQ Real gross domestic product BEA (Table 1.1.6, Line 1)
GCND Pers. cons. expend. on nondurable goods BEA (Table 1.1.5, Line 4)
GCS Pers. cons. expend. on services BEA (Table 1.1.5, Line 5)
NRI Real nonresidential investment BEA (Table 1.1.6, Line 8)
RI Real residential investment BEA (Table 1.1.6, Line 11)
P16 Civilian non-institutional pop. over 16 BLS (LNU00000000Q)
E16 Civilian employment (S.A.) BLS (LNS12000000)
TFP Real-time utilization adj. TFP Fernald (2012)
LBCPU Hourly non-farm business compensation BLS (PRS85006103)
FYFF Effective federal funds rate St. Louis FRED
E5Y Business conditions expected Michigan Consumer
during the next five years Sentiment Survey Table 16
Table 1.7: Data construction
Label Description Construction
GDPDEF GDP deflator GDPQ/GDP
C Real per-capita consumption (GCND+GCS)/P16/GDPDEF
Y Real per-capita output GDPQ/P16
I Real per-capita investment (NRI+RI)/P16
W Real wages LBCPU/GDPDEF
FFR Effective federal funds rate Quarterly average of FYFF
TFP Real-time utilization adj. TFP TFP
Notes: The data set constructed with U.S. data is transformed to match the model equivalents
specified in the observation equation (1.14) in the main text.
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1.E Further estimation results
Table 1.8: Prior and posterior distribution of complete information model
Prior Posterior
Parameter Description Distr. Mean Std Mean 5% 95%
hc Habit persistence B 0.6 0.1 0.82 0.79 0.86
κ Investment adj. costs N 6 2 9.07 6.68 11.26
α Capital share B 0.25 0.1 0.10 0.05 0.15
ϕ Inverse Frisch elasticity G 2 0.75 1.19 0.38 1.95
δ2 Capital utilization costs N 0.15 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.22
θp Price stickiness B 0.66 0.1 0.90 0.86 0.93
θw Wage stickiness B 0.66 0.1 0.67 0.55 0.79
χp Price indexation B 0.7 0.15 0.81 0.67 0.96
χw Wage indexation B 0.7 0.15 0.59 0.38 0.83
γdy Taylor rule: output growth N 0.1 0.1 0.22 0.09 0.35
γpi Taylor rule: inflation N 1.4 0.125 1.18 1.07 1.30
γR Interest rate smoothing B 0.7 0.1 0.80 0.77 0.83
ρis Inv.-specific TFP B 0.8 0.1 0.66 0.56 0.77
ρx Perm. neutral TFP B 0.8 0.1 0.96 0.95 0.98
ρz Temp. neutral TFP B 0.8 0.1 0.93 0.90 0.96
ρp Price markup B 0.7 0.1 0.56 0.38 0.74
ρw Wage markup B 0.7 0.1 0.91 0.86 0.96
ρplag Lagged price markup B 0.5 0.1 0.49 0.39 0.60
ρwlag Lagged wage markup B 0.5 0.1 0.57 0.47 0.66
100σx Perm. TFP IG 0.5 5 0.17 0.13 0.23
100σz Temp. TFP IG 1 5 0.73 0.66 0.80
100σm Monetary policy IG 1 5 0.26 0.24 0.28
100σis Investment-spec. TFP IG 1 5 9.50 6.32 12.64
100σp Price markup IG 1 5 3.22 2.13 4.22
100σw Wage markup IG 1 5 14.56 4.90 28.32
Notes: The complete information modelM2 is estimated with a precise signal, i.e. σs = 0. B
is beta distribution, G is gamma distribution, IG is inverse gamma distribution, N is normal
distribution.
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Table 1.9: Prior and posterior distribution of incomplete information model with
identical productivity parameters
Prior Posterior
Parameter Description Distr. Mean Std Mean 5% 95%
hc Habit persistence B 0.6 0.1 0.59 0.54 0.64
κ Investment adj. costs N 6 2 7.02 4.58 9.44
α Capital share B 0.3 0.1 0.14 0.06 0.24
ϕ Inverse Frisch elasticity G 2 0.75 1.45 0.58 2.21
δ2 Capital utilization costs N 0.2 0.1 0.08 0.00 0.18
θp Price stickiness B 0.7 0.1 0.91 0.89 0.94
θw Wage stickiness B 0.7 0.1 0.78 0.67 0.87
χp Price indexation B 0.7 0.2 0.88 0.80 0.97
χw Wage indexation B 0.7 0.2 0.47 0.23 0.74
γdy Taylor rule: output growth N 0.1 0.1 0.08 -0.01 0.18
γpi Taylor rule: inflation N 1.4 0.125 1.001 1.000 1.005
γR Interest rate smoothing B 0.7 0.1 0.67 0.62 0.71
ρis Inv.-specific TFP B 0.8 0.1 0.70 0.58 0.80
ρx = ρz Neutral TFP B 0.8 0.1 0.95 0.93 0.97
ρp Price markup B 0.7 0.1 0.41 0.28 0.53
ρw Wage markup B 0.7 0.1 0.90 0.85 0.94
ρplag Lagged price markup B 0.5 0.1 0.46 0.36 0.56
ρwlag Lagged wage markup B 0.5 0.1 0.61 0.52 0.71
100σs Noise shock IG 1 5 0.51 0.25 0.77
100σa Neutral TFP IG 1 5 1.03 0.93 1.13
100σm Monetary policy IG 1 5 0.3 0.28 0.33
100σis Investment-spec. TFP IG 1 5 6.89 3.97 9.5
100σp Price markup IG 1 5 3.92 2.88 4.86
100σw Wage markup IG 1 5 32.3 9.93 53.69
Notes: The incomplete information modelM3 is estimated based on ρz = ρx. B is beta distri-
bution, G is gamma distribution, IG is inverse gamma distribution, N is normal distribution.
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Figure 1.4: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation monetary policy shock with parameters
at their posterior mean value. The dashed lines are 90 percent confidence bands. All variables
are measured in percentage deviations from steady state (x-axis). A time unit is a quarter
(y-axis).
Figure 1.5: Sensitivity to signal precision
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Notes: Fraction of impact consumption volatility attributed to noise shocks with parameters at
posterior mean and varying the signal precision between zero and ten percent.
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1.F.1 Fit of the model
Figure 1.6: U.S. data and smoothed observables
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1.F.2 Posterior mode check
Figure 1.7: Check plots for posterior mode maximization (1/3)
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Figure 1.8: Check plots for posterior mode maximization (2/3)
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Figure 1.9: Check plots for posterior mode maximization (3/3)
1.05 1.1 1.15 1.2
−880
−860
−840
−820
gamPi
2 3 4
x 10−3
−850
−845
−840
−835
sig_s
1 1.5 2
x 10−3
−1000
−950
−900
−850
−800
sig_x
4 6 8 10
x 10−3
−1100
−1000
−900
−800
sig_z
1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5
x 10−3
−1000
−950
−900
−850
−800
sig_m
0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12
−1000
−950
−900
−850
−800
sig_a_is
0.02 0.03 0.04
−1000
−950
−900
−850
−800
sig_p
0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12
−1000
−950
−900
−850
−800
sig_w
log−post log−lik kernel
48
1.F Estimation diagnostics
1.F.3 Prior and posterior distributions
Figure 1.10: Prior versus posterior distributionM1 (1/6)
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Figure 1.11: Prior versus posterior distributionM1 (2/6)
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Figure 1.12: Prior versus posterior distributionM1 (3/6)
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Figure 1.13: Prior versus posterior distributionM2 (4/6)
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Figure 1.14: Prior versus posterior distributionM2 (5/6)
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Figure 1.15: Prior versus posterior distributionM2 (6/6)
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Chapter 2
Sovereign default risk and state-dependent
twin deficits
2.1 Introduction
The notion of ‘twin deficits’ is based on the observation that the fiscal deficit and
the current account deficit increased in tandem during the 1980s in the U.S. economy.
In several European countries twin deficits also occurred in the years before and during
the global financial crisis, reviving the debate about whether increasing fiscal deficits
cause larger current account imbalances. In particular southern European countries
have experienced large increases in current account imbalances and widening fiscal
deficits. Since 2008-09 current accounts in these countries are rebalancing despite
protracted fiscal deficits, suggesting that the link between the twin deficits has
diminished. Fiscal deficits were partially the result of large fiscal stimulus packages
that were intended to foster economic growth. These large fiscal deficits increased
public debt stocks, bringing several European governments to the brink of default
and Greece to actually default in 2012. In light of the European sovereign debt
crisis, we examine whether public indebtedness affects the co-movement of the fiscal
balance and the current account. First, we provide empirical evidence showing that
the co-movement of the two balances depends on the government debt-to-GDP ratio.
Second, we examine whether a small open economy model with the possibility of
sovereign default can explain our empirical evidence.
In the first part of the analysis we estimate the government debt-to-GDP threshold
to separate our sample into a low and a high debt regime. For that purpose we
estimate a dynamic panel threshold model for 15 European countries to quantify the
influence of sovereign indebtedness on the relationship between the fiscal balance
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and the current account.1 One advantage of the dynamic panel estimation procedure
is that we estimate the threshold rather than exogenously imposing it. Based on
our estimation strategy we find that the government debt-to-GDP threshold is 72
percent. Splitting our sample into observations above and below the estimated
threshold, we find that the correlation of the two balances falls by 0.19 when moving
from the low government debt regime to the high government debt regime. In the
second part of our analysis we provide a theoretical explanation for the empirical
evidence. We allow for the possibility of sovereign default in a non-linear small
open economy model. High government debt-to-GDP ratios lead to increasing risk
premia as observed in troubled European countries. Facing higher uncertainty about
future taxes, households increase saving rather than accumulate debt to smooth
consumption during an economic downturn. Private saving increases while fiscal
deficits are expanding, leading to a less pronounced current account deficit. The
model-based correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account declines by 0.15
when moving from a low government debt regime to a high government debt regime,
which is in line with our empirical evidence.
From a theoretical point of view the relationship between the fiscal balance and
the current account is ambiguous. The national income accounting identity states
that the current account equals the flow of national savings of the private and the
public sector net of investment. A fiscal deficit (i.e. negative public saving) leads,
ceteris paribus, to a lower current account. Therefore the accounting identity implies
a perfect, positive correlation of the twin deficits. However, given fixed investment,
the endogenous private saving decision also affects the current account and thus the
relationship between the twin deficits. Households internalize the government budget
constraint and increase private saving as they expect that higher government debt
leads to higher future taxes – a point emphasized by proponents of the Ricardian
equivalence. If household saving increases sufficiently, it is possible that the current
account remains unaffected implying no co-movement of fiscal deficits and current
account deficits.
1Our baseline empirical specification follows Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2008) who estimate a
dynamic threshold model employing non-dynamic panel techniques based on Hansen (1999). We
apply the recently developed methodology of Kremer, Bick, and Nautz (2013) that allows for
the estimation of a dynamic panel threshold model, correcting for the potential bias from using
an endogenous regressor.
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In our theoretical model we try to account for a key feature of the recent Euro-
pean debt crisis, which is the possibility of sovereign default. We assume that the
government borrows from international investors and partially defaults when the
amount of government debt exceeds the fiscal limit. Following Bi (2012) the fiscal
limit is the maximum debt repayment capacity of the government, i.e. the present
discounted value of all possible future fiscal surpluses. International investors demand
non-linear sovereign default risk premia when public debt approaches unsustainable
levels. Labor taxes increase with the public debt stock. Optimizing households
receive transfers from the government and they consume, work and trade assets on
international financial markets.
The model is calibrated to match data for Greece, which is one of the countries
that experienced large external imbalances and high sovereign spreads in recent years.
A negative productivity shock at low government debt-to-GDP ratios leads to an
increase in taxes and the fiscal balance temporarily moves into deficit. To smooth
consumption households increase borrowing. This implies a strong, positive correlation
between the fiscal balance and the current account. A negative productivity shock
at high government debt levels affects households via expected labor taxes: First,
emerging sovereign risk premia destabilize the fiscal balance, triggering government
debt accumulation and increasing expected labor taxes. Second, a government default
reduces public debt and, thus, also taxes. As a consequence households expect a
larger dispersion of tax rates as government debt approaches high levels. These effects
induce optimizing households to increase their saving, which partially offsets current
account deficits that result from increasing fiscal deficits. Based on non-linear model
simulations with productivity shocks and transfer spending shocks at a low and at a
high government debt-to-GDP ratio we show that the correlation of the twins changes
by a comparable magnitude as in our empirical analysis.
Current account imbalances and their co-movement with fiscal deficits have received
much attention in the literature. The first intertemporal current account model is
studied in Sachs (1981) and is extended by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). Building
on these theoretical foundations, the studies of Glick and Rogoff (1995), Corsetti
and Müller (2008) and Bussière, Fratzscher, and Müller (2010) provide evidence that
productivity shocks are the main driver of current account dynamics. Corsetti and
Müller (2006) show that further important drivers of the co-movement of the twin
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deficits are the persistence of government spending and the openness of the economy.
Most empirical studies (e.g. Chinn and Prasad, 2003; Chinn and Ito, 2007; Gruber
and Kamin, 2007; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2012) find a significant positive relationship
in the medium-term between the fiscal balance and the current account using panel
methods.2 This chapter contributes new estimates using the estimation strategy
outlined in Kremer et al. (2013) finding a positive and significant coefficient for the
fiscal balance below the government debt threshold, but above the threshold the
estimate is slightly negative and insignificant. Our estimated threshold of 72 percent
is robust to alternative specifications of the empirical model.3
In closed economy frameworks Sutherland (1997) and Perotti (1999) show that the
consumption response of the private sector can depend on the government debt-to-
GDP ratio. In these models a fiscal deficit leads to an increase in consumption at
low debt levels, while a fiscal deficit leads to a decrease in consumption at high debt
levels. In difference to our framework these models do not allow for a government
default.
Increasing government debt-to-GDP ratios have received much attention in the
recent policy debate and the academic literature in the course of the European
sovereign debt crisis due to surging sovereign interest rates and sovereign default.
This work provides a theoretical framework that includes key features of the recent
crisis and shows that optimizing households internalize growing government debt
stocks, which leads to state-dependent dynamics.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reports our empirical results.
Section 2.3 outlines our theoretical model, derives the state-dependent fiscal limit
and discusses the non-linear solution method. Section 2.4 presents model simulations
which demonstrate that the co-movement of the twins is state-dependent. Section 2.5
provides the conclusion.
2A notable exception is Kim and Roubini (2008), who find evidence in favor of a ‘twin divergence’
rather than a ‘twin deficit’ for the U.S. based on VAR methods.
3Our estimated threshold is slightly higher than the estimate of Baum et al. (2013), who employ a
threshold model to examine non-linear effects of debt and real GDP growth rates.
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2.2 Empirical evidence
In the first part of our analysis, we provide empirical evidence on the co-movement
of the fiscal balance and the current account and how the relationship of the two
balances changes at different government debt-to-GDP ratios. Building on Nickel and
Vansteenkiste (2008) who estimate a similar dynamic panel threshold model with non-
dynamic panel methods, we apply the methodology of Kremer et al. (2013) to avoid
a possible endogeneity bias. Following this procedure we estimate the government
debt-to-GDP threshold. We show that the correlation of the fiscal balance and the
current account for the low and the high government debt regime are significantly
different from each other.
2.2.1 Estimation strategy
We apply the following dynamic panel threshold model to estimate the relationship
of the fiscal balance and the current account depending on the government debt-to-
GDP ratio:
CAit = µi + χCAi,t−1 (2.2.1)
+ β1FBitI(DebtitGDPit ≤ γ) + β2FBitI(DebtitGDPit > γ) + α′xit + uit,
where the current account (CA) and the fiscal balance (FB) are measured in percent
of GDP.4 The threshold level (γ) splits the threshold variable (the government debt-
to-GDP ratio) into two regimes. The set of control variables is denoted by xit. The
indicator function I(·) indicates the regime defined by the threshold variable qit and
the threshold level γ. Following previous literature (e.g. Bussière et al., 2006) we
include the lagged current account as a regressor in the baseline specification.
As in Caner and Hansen (2004), we first estimate a reduced form regression for the
endogenous variable on a set of instruments, in our case higher lags of the dependent
variable. We use the predicted values of the lagged dependent variable ĈAi,t−1 to
replace CAi,t−1. Second, we repeatedly estimate equation (2.2.1) via least squares
for all n threshold candidates to obtain the sum of squared residuals Sn(γ). The
4Following previous literature (e.g. Chinn and Prasad, 2003; Gruber and Kamin, 2007) we assume
that the fiscal balance is not endogenous to the current account. It seems unlikely that European
policymakers systematically adjust the fiscal balance to changes in the current account.
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estimated threshold is selected as the one that minimizes the sum of squared residuals:
γˆ = argmin
γ
Sn(γ). (2.2.2)
The confidence interval for the estimated threshold level γˆ according to Caner and
Hansen (2004) is given by
Γˆ = {γ : LRn(γ) ≤ C}, (2.2.3)
where C denotes the 95% percentile of the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood
ratio statistic LRn(γ). Given the estimate of the threshold γˆ, the slope coefficients
of equation (2.2.1) are estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM).
Further details on the estimation strategy can be found in Appendix 2.B.
2.2.2 Estimation results
The data set is an unbalanced panel of 15 European countries from 1980 to 2010.5
Table 2.1 provides the main results of our baseline estimation. The series of threshold
candidates ranges from 29.2 percent to 101.6 percent of government debt-to-GDP.6
The threshold estimate of the government debt-to-GDP ratio is 71.8 percent. This
threshold value splits the sample into 260 observations below and 93 observations
above the threshold. The 95 percent confidence interval of the threshold ranges from
69.4 percent to 75.0 percent.
The estimated coefficients for the fiscal balance differ significantly across both
regimes. The fiscal balance is positively correlated (0.16) with the current account
if government debt is below the threshold. However, in the high government debt
regime, there is virtually no relationship (-0.04) between the fiscal balance and the
current account. Thus, a one percent increase in the fiscal deficit is associated with
a current account deterioration of 0.16 percent in the low government debt regime,
while the same increase in the fiscal deficit has virtually no influence on the current
account in the high government debt regime.
5Detailed information about the data set is given in Appendix 2.A.
6We follow Hansen (1999) and trim the series of threshold candidates by excluding those that lie in
the highest and in the lowest 5% quantile to avoid that the threshold sorts too few observations
in one of the regimes.
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A number of previous studies (see Chinn and Prasad, 2003; Chinn and Ito, 2007;
Gruber and Kamin, 2007; Bussière, Fratzscher, and Müller, 2010; Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2012) estimate the relationship of the fiscal balance and the current account
without applying a threshold model. These studies find a positive relationship between
these two balances ranging from 0.06 to 0.3. Our fiscal balance estimate for the
low government debt regime is in line with these previous estimates. The estimated
coefficient of the lagged current account is positive (0.59) and highly significant. This
estimate reflects the high persistence of current account dynamics and, thus, the
importance of estimating a dynamic model of the current account.
Table 2.1: Estimation results
Variable Coefficient Std. dev.
Current account (t− 1) 0.59*** (0.16)
Fiscal balance (Debt/GDP ≤ γˆ) 0.16** (0.07)
Fiscal balance (Debt/GDP > γˆ) -0.04 (0.05)
Terms of trade 0.05*** (0.02)
Openness -0.01 (0.01)
Relative income to U.S. 0.01 (0.04)
Output gap (in % of potential GDP) -0.28*** (0.11)
Change of total investment (in % of GDP) -0.14 (0.08)
Labor productivity 0.04 (0.03)
Real effective exchange rate -0.06*** (0.02)
Dependency ratio (% of working-age pop.) 0.16** (0.08)
Threshold estimate (in % of GDP) γˆ = 71.8
95% confidence region [69.4− 75.0]
Total number of observations 353
Dependent Variable: Current account (t). */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent
level. Standard errors in brackets. The threshold of 71.8% splits the sample into 260 observations
below and 93 observations above the threshold. The current account and the fiscal balance are
measured in percent of GDP.
The point estimates of the control variables are consistent with previous studies
and in line with implications of theoretical open economy models. The estimated
threshold of 71.8 percent is robust to a range of alternative specifications of the panel
model. A detailed discussion of the results, several robustness checks and a detailed
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discussion of the related empirical literature can be found in Appendix 2.B.
The estimation yields evidence for significant differences in the regime-dependent
fiscal balance coefficients indicating that the co-movement of the fiscal balance and
the current account is state-dependent. The estimated regime-dependent coefficients
(βi) are partial correlations. In our theoretical analysis (in Section 2.3) we examine the
model-implied correlation of the two balances at a low and at a high government debt
level. The correlation of the twins implied by the model cannot be directly compared
to the estimated partial correlations of the panel threshold model. Table 2.2 reports
the correlation of the two balances in the data for observations below and above the
estimated government debt-to-GDP threshold. For observations below the threshold
of 71.8 percent the correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account is 0.57,
whereas the correlation is 0.38 for observations above the threshold. Therefore, the
difference amounts to 0.19. The confidence intervals for the correlations in both
debt regimes indicate that these values are significantly different at a 10 percent
significance level. The change in the correlation (0.22) of the two balances is robust to
considering the lower (69.4%) and the upper (75.0%) bound of the confidence region.
Table 2.2: Regime-dependent correlations of fiscal balance and current account
Threshold: γi corr(FB,CA) < γi corr(FB,CA) > γi ∆ corr(FB,CA)
71.8 0.57 [0.50, 0.64] 0.38 [0.26, 0.49] 0.19
69.4 0.58 [0.51, 0.64] 0.35 [0.25, 0.47] 0.22
75.0 0.56 [0.50, 0.63] 0.33 [0.21, 0.46] 0.22
Notes: The left column states the estimated threshold value γˆ of 71.8 percent and its confidence
bounds of 69.4 and 75.0 percent debt-to-GDP. The second and third column report the
correlations of the fiscal balance (FB) and the current account (CA) below and above the
threshold value. The 90 percent confidence interval of the correlations is reported in brackets.
∆ corr(FB,CA) denotes the difference between the correlation in the low debt regime and the
correlation in the high debt regime.
In the backdrop of the current account identity our empirical findings suggest that
households’ behavior responds differently to fiscal deficits at low government debt-to-
GDP ratios compared to high ratios: The higher the government debt-to-GDP ratio,
the stronger households compensate a fiscal deficit by increasing saving, offsetting the
effect of a fiscal deficit on the current account. This finding is robust to considering
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the correlations as well as the regime-dependent partial correlation estimates. The
behavior of households at high government debt-to-GDP ratios is consistent with
the implications of the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis. In the next section we
examine the occurrence of twin deficits in a structural model to provide a theoretical
explanation for the observed change in the correlation of the ‘twins’.
2.3 The Model
In our theoretical analysis, we consider a small open economy model with default-
able public debt and private asset holdings that are both held by foreign investors.
Households borrow and lend at a time-invariant world interest rate facing portfolio
adjustment costs. The government raises distortionary labor taxes, pays transfers
to households and invests in unproductive government expenditures. The govern-
ment can default on its outstanding debt. Risk-neutral foreign investors require an
endogenous default risk premium when government debt approaches the ‘effective
fiscal limit’. Following Bi (2012) the effective fiscal limit is a random draw from the
model-implied state-dependent distribution of the fiscal limit. A sovereign default
occurs when the government debt stock exceeds the effective fiscal limit.
2.3.1 Households
Consider an economy populated by an infinite number of identical households that
choose consumption ct, leisure Lt, and debt dHt to maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct, Lt) , (2.3.1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, subject to the budget constraint
ct = Wt (1− τt) (1− Lt) + zt + dHt − (1 + r)dHt−1 −
ψ
2
(
dHt − dH
)2
, (2.3.2)
and a no-Ponzi scheme condition. The budget constraint includes consumption ct,
after tax income Wt (1− τt) (1− Lt), government transfers zt to the households and
operations in international financial markets. Households trade a riskless bond dHt
(positive values of dHt denote debt) at a constant world interest rate r. Following
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Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) we assume quadratic portfolio adjustment costs that
are weighted by the parameter ψ > 0, where dH denotes the steady state net foreign
asset position of households. We set the discount factor β equal to one over the gross
world interest rate:
β(1 + r) = 1 . (2.3.3)
We assume Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) preferences
u(c, L) =
(
ct − χ (1−Lt)ωω
)1−σ − 1
1− σ , (2.3.4)
where the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 1/(ω − 1) and χ > 0 determines the
relative disutility of labor. The degree of relative risk aversion is measured by σ > 0.
As pointed out by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003) as well as by Mendoza and Yue
(2012), these preferences simplify the supply side of the model and help to explain
international business cycle facts.7 The households’ first-order conditions are
(
ct − χ(1− Lt)
ω
ω
)−σ
= λt (2.3.5)
1− Lt =
[
Wt(1− τt)
χ
] 1
ω−1
(2.3.6)
λt
(
1− ψ(dHt − dH)
)
= β(1 + r)Etλt+1 , (2.3.7)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint.
2.3.2 Production
The production function of output is linear in labor:
yt = At (1− Lt) . (2.3.8)
7Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences remove the wealth effect, which helps to avoid counterfactual
increases in labor when total factor productivity falls.
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The process of total factor productivity (TFP), At, follows an AR(1) process:
ln
(
At
A
)
= ρA ln
(
At−1
A
)
+ A,t , A,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2A
)
, (2.3.9)
where A denotes steady state productivity.
Wages are determined on a competitive labor market. Thus, the wage equals the
marginal product of labor which in our case equals TFP:
Wt = At . (2.3.10)
2.3.3 Government
The government receives tax revenues τtWt (1− Lt) through distortionary labor
taxation and issues new public debt bt at a given price qt. It finances government
spending gt and transfers zt. In addition, the government can default on the fraction
4t of its outstanding debt and pays back the remaining debt from last period
bdt = (1−4t) bt−1. Hence, the government budget constraint is:
τtAt (1− Lt) + btqt = bdt + gt + zt . (2.3.11)
We assume that the tax rate τt adjusts linearly to the public debt stock:
τt − τ = γb
(
bdt − b
)
. (2.3.12)
Government spending is a stationary process that responds systematically to changes
in productivity. The parameter γg measures the elasticity of government spending gt
with respect to productivity:
log
(
gt
g
)
= γg log
(
At
A
)
. (2.3.13)
Transfers follow a Markov switching process with a stationary and a non-stationary
regime as in Davig and Leeper (2011):
zt =
(1− ρz)z + ρzzt−1 + z,t for SZ,t = 1µzt−1 + z,t for SZ,t = 2 , (2.3.14)
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where |ρz| < 1, µ > 1 and z,t ∼ N
(
0, σ2z
)
. Transfers follow a stationary path when
SZ,t = 1 and an explosive path when SZ,t = 2, where the regimes, SZ,t, follow a
Markov chain with transition matrix pMS 1− pMS
1− pMS pMS
 . (2.3.15)
With probability pMS government transfers stay in one of the regimes. For example,
in case of a high probability pMS transfers are likely to grow for many periods in
the non-stationary regime leading to government debt accumulation. The process
switches from one regime to the other with probability 1− pMS, such that transfers
are ultimately stabilized (as ρz < 1).
2.3.4 Foreign investors
Domestic households and the domestic government borrow and lend from foreign
investors. Unlike the households, the government can default on a fraction of its
outstanding debt stock. Foreign investors have access to an international credit
market where they can borrow or lend unlimited amounts at a constant world interest
rate r > 0.
Foreign investors act in competitive markets and choose loans bt in each period
to maximize expected profits φt, taking prices as given. Risk-neutral investors price
bonds such that they break even in expected value:
φt = −btqt + Et
[
(1−∆t+1)
1 + r bt
]
. (2.3.16)
Consequently the equilibrium government bond price qt reflects the risk of default
that investors face:
qt = Et
[
(1−∆t+1)
1 + r
]
. (2.3.17)
As international investors are risk neutral and are fully compensated for the default
risk they are indifferent between holding household debt and government bonds.
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2.3.5 Current account
In our model household and government liabilities are held vis-a`-vis the rest of
the world. Borrowing and lending of the private and public sector affect the current
account as follows:
CAprivatet = −dHt + dHt−1 , (2.3.18)
CApublict = −btqt + bt−1qt−1 . (2.3.19)
The private sector current account equals the change in households’ saving. The
public current account is identical to the fiscal balance as the entire public debt stock
is held abroad. The sum of both sub-balances amounts to the aggregate current
account CAt.8
2.3.6 Laffer curve and fiscal limit
The proportional labor tax induces a distortion in the economy as it influences the
households’ labor decision, which in turn affects government tax revenues. Distor-
tionary labor taxation gives rise to a Laffer curve and, hence, to a revenue-maximizing
tax rate. With Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences tax revenues amount to:
Tt = τtWt (1− Lt) = τtWt
[
Wt(1− τt)
χ
] 1
ω−1
. (2.3.20)
The maximum amount of tax revenues, Tmaxt , is generated at the revenue-maximizing
tax rate which is at the peak of the Laffer curve. The revenue-maximizing tax rate,
τmaxt , is derived as follows:
∂Tt
∂τt
= Wt
[
Wt(1− τt)
χ
] 1
ω−1
+ τtWt
1
ω − 1
[
Wt(1− τt)
χ
] 1
ω−1−1 (
−Wt
χ
)
= 0
⇔ τmaxt =
ω − 1
ω
.
Although the revenue-maximizing tax rate only depends on the Frisch elasticity of
8Note that positive values of dHt and bdt mean that households and the government have external
liabilities. An increase of dHt or bdt implies a negative current account.
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labor supply, the maximum amount of tax revenues also depends on the state of the
economy (in our case TFP).
Next, we use the revenue-maximizing tax rate to derive the fiscal limit which is
a state-dependent distribution. Following Bi (2012) the state-dependent fiscal limit
B∗(At, zt, SZ,t) is the maximum level of debt that the government is able to service, i.e.
the present discounted value of all possible future fiscal surpluses.9 The fiscal limit
depends on the exogenous states At, zt and SZ,t as well as their future realizations
(j ≥ 1) and the parameters of the model:
B∗(At, zt, SZ,t) =
∞∑
j=0
βt+j
(
Tmaxt+j − gt+j − zt+j
)
.
We derive the fiscal limit from the perspective of risk-neutral foreign investors,
who price the bonds, and thus we set the stochastic discount factor to β. To
simulate the fiscal limit B∗(At, zt, SZ,t) for given initial conditions (At, zt, SZ,t) we
randomly draw future shocks At+j, zt+j and SZ,t+j for j = 1, 2, .., N .10 Based on
m = 1, 2, ...,M simulations of B∗m(At, zt, SZ,t), we approximate the state-dependent
fiscal limit B∗(At, zt, SZ,t) by a normal distribution for each state of the economy.
It is often challenging for investors to determine whether a government is actually
willing to increase taxes or to cut spending to avoid a default. Possible resistance
by the population against austerity measures might also influence political decisions.
Hence, international investors face a high degree of uncertainty that surrounds
political processes in countries with high government debt-to-GDP ratios when
pricing government bonds. In our model the political uncertainty is reflected by
randomly drawing an effective fiscal limit, which follows a state-dependent distribution.
As in Bi (2012) the government defaults when the public debt stock bt−1 exceeds the
effective fiscal limit b∗t .11
Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2008) show that international investors can usually
negotiate a repayment of a large share of the original claim after a default. Therefore,
we assume that the government does not default on its entire debt stock, but on the
9As Bi (2012) we do not consider the expected value of the fiscal limit, but all possible realizations
and thus the fiscal limit is a distribution.
10We simulate N = 200 periods and repeat this calculation M = 100000 (m = 1, 2, ...M) times. At
longer horizons the discounted value of government fiscal surpluses is virtually zero.
11In contrast, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Arellano (2008) provide a model of sovereign default
where the government has an incentive to default despite being able to repay its debt.
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fraction δ ∈ [0, 1] which reflects the size of the ‘haircut’. Hence, the default scheme is:
∆t =
 0 if bt−1 < b
∗
t ∼ B∗(At, zt, SZ,t)
δ if bt−1 ≥ b∗t ∼ B∗(At, zt, SZ,t) .
(2.3.21)
2.3.7 Calibration
We calibrate the model to match annual data for Greece from 1960 to 2010. The
case of Greece is particularly interesting for our analysis as the country currently has
the highest debt stock in Europe, experiences surging sovereign interest rates and
has large external imbalances.12 Table 2.3 summarizes the calibration of the model.
In line with previous literature we pick conventional values for the discount factor,
the coefficient of relative risk aversion, the Frisch elasticity and the disutility of labor.
Portfolio adjustment costs are chosen to match the standard deviation of the trade
balance to output ratio following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). The steady state
level of TFP is normalized to 1.
Figure 2.1: Government spending, transfers and taxes in Greece
25
30
35
40
p
e
r c
e
n
t  
o
f  
G
D
P
government spending transfers taxes
0
5
10
15
20
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
p
e
r c
e
n
t  
o
f  
G
D
P
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 86 (2009).
12State-dependent twin deficits also occur when calibrating the model to another country with a
different fiscal limit. As we show in the next section households saving increases in the proximity
of the respective fiscal limit.
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Figure 2.1 shows that the ratio of government spending relative to GDP in Greece
remained stable over the last decades. Average government spending is 16.57 percent of
GDP and average lump-sum transfers amount to 12.27 percent of GDP. The elasticity
of government spending with respect to real GDP per worker, γg, is estimated in
a linear regression for the full sample. The estimation yields a value of -0.07. The
estimated response of taxes to an increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio is 0.42 in a linear
regression. The government therefore raises taxes by about 1 percentage point in
response to an increase of government debt by 2.5 percent of GDP.
Table 2.3: Model calibration to Greek economy
Parameter Value Target/Source
Discount factor β 0.95 Annual interest rate: 5.26%
Relative risk aversion σ 2 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003)
Frisch elasticity 1/(1− ω) 0.9 Kimball and Shapiro (2008)
Disutility of labor χ 3.173 Steady state labor supply: 25%
Portfolio adjustment costs Ψ 0.005 Std(trade balance/GDP): 7.3%
Steady state TFP A 1 TFP normalized to one
Government spending/GDP g/y 16.57% OECD EO No. 86 (2009)
Transfer/GDP z/y 12.27% OECD EO No. 86 (2009)
Gov. spending elasticity γg -0.07 Own estimate
Tax reaction coefficient γb 0.42 Own estimate
Government debt/GDP b/y 60% Bank of Greece (2013)
Household debt/GDP dH/y 60% Avg. external priv. debt/GDP
Tax rate τ 31.84% Avg. government debt/GDP
Default rate δ 15% Bi (2012), EU Commission
Productivity persistence ρA 0.53 Own estimate
Std. dev. of prod. shock σA 0.027 Own estimate
Transfer spending persistence ρz 0.9 Bi et al. (2013)
Explosive transfer growth µ 1.01 Bi et al. (2013)
Markov switching probability pMS 0.9 Bi et al. (2013)
Std. dev. of transfer shock σz 0.07 Own estimate
Average fiscal limit:
Mean (% of GDP) B∗ 156% MCMC simulation
Std. dev. (% of GDP) σB∗ 21% MCMC simulation
We set the steady state of total external debt-to-GDP ratio to 120 percent to match
average total external liabilities of Greece from 1995 to 2010. About half of total
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gross external debt are public sector liabilities.13 Thus, in our calibration, half of
total external debt is public external debt and the other half is private sector external
debt. As total external liabilities are 120 percent of GDP, we set both the private
and public external debt-to-GDP ratio to 60 percent of GDP. To match the average
government debt-to-GDP ratio of 60 percent we set the steady state tax rate to 31.84
percent.
We consider various sources to calibrate the size of the haircut in our model for the
case of Greece. The European Commission (2011) forecast in autumn 2011 published
before the debt restructuring in 2012 reports a government debt-to-GDP ratio of 198.3
percent at the end of 2012. The most recent forecast release in spring 2013 of the
European Commission (2013) for the government debt-to-GDP ratio after the debt
restructuring is 161.6 percent, suggesting that the haircut is estimated to effectively
lower public debt by 18 percent at the end of 2012. Considering the empirical evidence
of previous debt restructurings, Bi (2012) computes historical haircuts indicating an
average size of 13 percent (excluding default events below a haircut of 3 percent).
A haircut of this size is also in line with estimates in Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer
(2008), Panizza (2008) and Moody’s (2011). Therefore, we choose a conservative
value of 15 percent for the default fraction.14
We estimate the exogenous processes for productivity and transfers using HP-
filtered data. The log of productivity as measured by real GDP per worker has
a persistence of 0.53 and a standard deviation of 0.027 of the shock. Figure 2.1
illustrates that transfer payments from the government to households continuously
increased in Greece over the last decades. Following Bi, Leeper, and Leith (2013)
we set the Markov switching probability pMS of the transfer process to 0.9. This
implies that on average the transfer process stays in each regime for ten years. The
parameter of the explosive transfer growth µ is set to 1.01 to match the growth of
transfers in Greece since 1960 and ρz is set to 0.9. The estimated standard deviation
13Based on data from the Bank of Greece 56 percent of total external debt is government debt. To
our knowledge disaggregated data for the pre-1995 period is not available.
14In March 2012 Greece implemented a 53.5 percent haircut to the nominal value of debt held by
the private sector, which roughly held half of the total debt stock suggesting a haircut of around
25 percent. Later in 2012 the Troika (ECB, IMF and European Commission) had to recapitalize
the Greek banking system, which was holding around one-third of government debt, effectively
reducing the net impact of the debt restructuring. However, assuming a higher default fraction
does not alter the mechanism of the model and only changes the maximum risk premia that the
international investors demand from the government.
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of the transfer shock is 0.07 in a least squares regression.
Based on the calibration we determine the resulting average mean and standard
deviation across all fiscal limits. The mean of all fiscal limits is 156 percent of steady
state output and the standard deviation is 21 percent as a fraction of steady state
GDP. The next section addresses how the fiscal limit changes with the state of the
economy.
2.3.8 Laffer curve and fiscal limit for Greece
The revenue maximizing tax rate only depends on the Frisch elasticity. Figure 2.2
shows the Laffer curve for three different values of the Frisch elasticity. Based on the
calibration of our model the revenue-maximizing tax rate is 52.6 percent. This tax
rate is close to the revenue maximizing labor tax rate of about 60 percent for Greece
estimated by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011).
Figure 2.2: Sensitivity of Laffer curve to the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
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Figure 2.3 displays the distribution of the fiscal limit based on the calibrated model.
The fiscal limit depends on the state of the economy. The left panel depicts the
probability density function for different productivity states, while the right panel
shows the cumulative density function. As the fiscal limit shifts with the state of the
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Figure 2.3: State-dependent distribution of the fiscal limit
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Notes: State-dependent distributions of the fiscal limit for different TFP states and transfers
in steady state of the stationary regime. Each distribution is approximated by a normal
distribution. The left panel shows the probability density functions and the right panel shows
the cumulative density functions.
economy, the default probability is also state-dependent. In a recession, i.e. in a low
productivity state, the average fiscal limit is much lower compared to an economy
that is in a high productivity state. During an economic downturn tax revenues are
smaller and productivity is likely to stay at low levels due to its persistence. These
two effects lower average future fiscal surpluses, shifting the mean of the fiscal limit to
lower government debt-to-GDP ratios. The mean of the fiscal limit is at 163 percent
of GDP for an intermediate TFP state, 146 percent of GDP for the lowest TFP
state and 183 percent of GDP for the highest TFP state when transfers are at the
mean and in the stationary regime.15 For low TFP states sovereign risk premia occur
around 130 percent government debt-to-GDP. This value is close to actual data for
15The fiscal limit also shifts with different states of transfer spending and the Markov switching
process between stable and explosive transfer growth. The mean of the fiscal limit is at 140
percent of GDP when transfers are in the highest state and at 189 percent of GDP when transfers
are in the lowest state with productivity at steady state and in the stationary transfer regime. A
shift from the stable to the explosive transfer regime leads to a shift of the mean of the fiscal
limit from 163 percent of debt to GDP to 150 percent of debt to GDP with productivity and
transfers at their steady state.
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Greece as sovereign bond spreads have increased dramatically since April 2010 when
government debt-to-GDP was 131 percent. Since 2008 the country is also in a severe
recession, which is reflected by a low TFP state in the model.
2.3.9 Solution method
The model features non-linearities due to the possibility of government default
and the regime switching of government transfers. For our calibration the fiscal
limit is far away from the steady state. For these reasons we use a global solution
method to solve the model. The complete set of model equilibrium conditions is
listed in Appendix 2.C. We express the model by two first-order difference equations
to solve for two policy functions. In particular, the first equilibrium condition is the
households’ first-order condition (2.3.7) and the second equilibrium condition is the
government budget constraint (2.3.11) combined with the first-order condition of
foreign investors (2.3.17):
λ(Ψt)
(
1− ψ((fdH (Ψt)− dH)
)
= β (1 + r)Etλ(Ψt+1) (2.3.22)
bdt + gt + zt − τ(Ψt)At(1− L(Ψt))
f b(Ψt)
= Et
{
(1−∆(f b(Ψt), fdH (Ψt), At+1, zt+1, SZ,t+1)
1 + r
}
(2.3.23)
where Ψt =
{
bdt , d
H
t−1, At, zt, SZ,t
}
is the state vector of the economy. To solve the
model we employ the non-linear algorithm described in Coleman (1991) and Davig
(2004). This procedures discretizes the state space Ψt and finds a fixed point in the
policy rules bt = f b(Ψt) and dHt = fd
H (ψt) for each grid point in the state space.
Further details on the solution method are in Appendix 2.D.
2.4 Model results
First, we show that the correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account
changes with the government debt-to-GDP ratio. Then, we provide intuition for
the change of the correlation examining policy rules. Finally, to illustrate the state-
dependent model dynamics, we present impulse responses to productivity shocks at a
low and at a high government debt-to-GDP ratio.
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2.4.1 State-dependence of twin deficits
Table 2.4 presents the correlations between the fiscal balance and the current
account at a low and at a high government debt-to-GDP ratio.16 The correlation
of the two balances declines as government debt-to-GDP levels increase, in line
with our empirical results in Section 2.2. The model with both shocks implies a
perfect correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account for public debt-to-
GDP at 60 percent. The correlation of the twins declines to 0.85 at a government
debt-to-GDP ratio of 140 percent. Therefore the change in the correlation is 0.15
when moving from the low government debt regime to the high debt regime. At low
government debt levels government and household debt co-move almost one-for-one
(corr(CAprivate, FB) = 0.99). However, at high government debt-to-GDP levels the
correlation is much lower (corr(CAprivate, FB) = 0.04).
To compare our model-implied correlation with actual data we report the state-
dependent correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account calculated in
Section 2.2 for 15 European countries. Table 2.4 reports the absolute change (0.19)
in the correlations of the twins between the high and low government debt regime
in the data. The model-implied change in the correlation (0.15) is close to the one
found in the data.
To shed light on the relative importance of each shock Table 2.4 also reports
correlations conditional on each shock. Even though the correlation of the fiscal
balance and the current account conditional on transfer shocks is high (0.86) in the
low debt regime, it is negative (-0.36) in the high debt regime. In line with Corsetti
and Müller (2008) we find that the unconditional correlation of the two balances in
the model is dominated by TFP shocks.
2.4.2 Model dynamics
To highlight the key transmission mechanisms we discuss the properties of two
policy functions: sovereign interest rates and households’ saving. International
investors demand risk premia when government debt approaches the fiscal limit and
16The reported statistics for the model are an average over 500 simulations of eight years each. We
only include simulations without default episodes. We choose a short simulation period to avoid
a possible bias in the reported results by excluding too many draws that result in a government
default that implies a large current account surplus.
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Table 2.4: State-dependent correlations of fiscal balance and current account
Low vs. high government debt-to-GDP: ∆ corr(FB,CA)
Data 0.19
Model 0.15
Low government debt-to-GDP: 60 percent
Both shocks 1.00
TFP shocks 1.00
Transfer shocks 0.86
High government debt-to-GDP: 140 percent
Both shocks 0.85
TFP shocks 0.86
Transfer shocks -0.36
Notes: Correlations of fiscal balance (FB) and current account (CA), both in percent of GDP.
The low government debt level is the steady state value of the model. ∆ corr(FB,CA) denotes
the difference between the correlation of the low debt regime and the correlation of the high
debt regime. All simulations are based on the stationary transfer regime.
the probability of default increases (see Figure 2.4). Up to a government debt-to-GDP
ratio of around 100 percent foreign investors do not demand sovereign default risk
premia as they expect no risk of a government default in the next period independent
of today’s productivity state. Hence, sovereign bond yields equal the risk-free rate.
Sovereign interest rates increase up to 24 percent for high government debt levels.
Since international investors are risk neutral they demand risk premia that offset the
expected loss due to the possible government default.
The government debt level at which investors demand risk premia depends on the
state of the economy as the latter affects the fiscal limit. For example, if the economy
is in a recession, i.e. in a low TFP state, tax revenues are low and the fiscal limit is
shifted to the left. Hence, in a recession the probability of sovereign default is much
higher as compared to an economy in a high productivity state. Consequently, at the
lowest productivity state default risk premia begin to emerge at around 100 percent
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of government debt-to-GDP, whereas at the highest TFP state risk premia emerge at
around 160 percent of government debt-to-GDP.
Figure 2.4: Sovereign interest rates at different government debt-to-GDP ratios
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is in the stationary regime. Horizontal axis: ratio of government debt-to-GDP. Vertical axis: in
percentage points.
Households trade assets with foreign investors to smooth consumption and to
insure against expected tax changes due to the risk of government default. The
saving decision at different productivity states depends non-linearly on the public
debt stock (see Figure 2.5). When government debt-to-GDP is around 60 percent
(steady state) households accumulate debt relative to steady state household debt to
smooth consumption at a low TFP state. However, around 140 percent government
debt-to-GDP ratio households save relative to steady state household debt in all TFP
states as public debt increases.
The households’ saving decision is influenced by the level of government debt due
to the possibility of government default in the proximity of the fiscal limit. A more
costly roll-over of government debt increases the fiscal deficit and leads to higher
expected future labor taxes. However, households benefit from a realized government
default as a default leads to lower government debt and, thus, to lower distortionary
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taxes.17 The distortion caused by labor tax increases with higher government debt
levels. To insure against higher expected future labor taxes households save relative
to steady state household debt when government debt is high even when faced with
negative TFP shocks.
Figure 2.5: Households’ saving decision at different government debt-to-GDP ratios
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Notes: Transfer spending is at steady state and in the stable process. Horizontal axis: ratio of
government debt-to-GDP. Vertical axis: households’ choice of debt in percent of GDP when
the households’ debt stock in the last period is at steady state.
2.4.3 Impulse response functions
We simulate the model conditional on a negative productivity shock at different
government debt-to-GDP ratios to assess the state-dependent dynamics. A negative
TFP shock captures the economic downturn of Greece which is in a recession since
2008. The shock destabilizes the fiscal sector leading to sovereign interest rate spreads
at high public debt levels.
17Introducing an exogenous cost of default as in Arellano (2008) would lead to a stronger increase
of household saving at high government debt as households would try to insure against this cost.
This would lead to a stronger reduction of the correlation of the twins.
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Figure 2.6 displays the effects of a negative TFP shock at a low (60%) and a
high (140%) government debt-to-GDP ratio. At a low government debt-to-GDP
ratio higher tax rates and lower output leads households to increase debt to smooth
consumption. Households therefore increase private debt, i.e. the change in private
saving is negative. Hence, the change in private saving and the fiscal balance co-move
positively and the aggregate current account turns negative. Thus, the correlation of
the fiscal balance and the current account is unity.
Figure 2.6: Simulation of negative TFP shock at low vs. high government debt
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Notes: Impulse responses to a 3 percent negative productivity shock. We initialize the simulation
at 60% government debt-to-GDP (blue solid line) and 140% government debt-to-GDP (red
dashed line). Household debt is set to its ergodic mean. A time unit is one year.
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At high government debt levels the negative productivity shock of the same size
causes labor and tax revenues to decline, government spending to increase and the
fiscal balance turns negative. Growing government debt brings the stock of sovereign
debt close to the fiscal limit, leading to a surge of sovereign risk premia. Households
increase saving as they expect that further increases of government debt and tax rates
are very likely. The change in private saving therefore turns positive and outweighs
the negative contribution of the fiscal balance such that the current account moves
into surplus. Due to the endogenous reaction of household saving, the correlation
between the fiscal balance and the current account is much lower at high government
debt-to-GDP than at a low ratio. In addition, the simulation reflects a situation where
increasing risk premia destabilize the government debt-to-GDP ratio as observed
during the current European sovereign debt crisis. Without a strong reduction of
government expenditures or higher tax revenues the government debt stock is not
sustainable resulting in a default in accordance with the actual debt restructuring of
Greece in 2012.
2.4.4 Discussion of results
In line with the empirical results our model provides an explanation for the decline
in the correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account as the government debt-
to-GDP ratio increases. The households’ optimal saving decision changes with the
government debt-to-GDP ratio and, thus, explains the change of the correlation. The
current account identity implies that a fiscal deficit leads, ceteris paribus, to a lower
current account. However at high government debt-to-GDP ratios the endogenous
saving decision of optimizing households counteracts widening fiscal deficits. In
particular, as illustrated by the impulse responses to a negative TFP shock, private
saving increases at high government debt, but falls at low government debt-to-GDP
ratios. Hence, the correlation of the ‘twins’ is state-dependent and at high government
debt households’ saving behavior alleviates the fall in the current account. The change
in the model-based correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account is 0.15,
which is in line with the change in the empirical correlation of the twins.
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2.5 Conclusion
In the first part of this chapter, we estimate a government debt-to-GDP threshold
based on a dynamic panel threshold model following Kremer et al. (2013) for a sample
of 15 European countries. One advantage of the dynamic panel estimation procedure
is that we estimate the threshold rather than exogenously imposing it. We contribute
to the twin deficits debate by showing that the correlation of the fiscal balance and
the current account depends on the government debt-to-GDP ratio. Based on the
estimated threshold of 72 percent we distinguish between a low and a high government
debt regime. For each regime we calculate the correlation of the fiscal balance and
the current account and find that the state-dependent correlation falls by 0.19 when
moving from observations below the threshold to those that are above the threshold.
In the second part of this chapter, we examine a small open economy model allowing
for sovereign default to show that the correlation of the twin deficits depends on
the level of government debt in line with the observed empirical findings. At high
government debt-to-GDP ratios the looming sovereign default risk increases sovereign
interest rates, which deteriorate the fiscal balance. Rising sovereign debt levels lead to
higher labor taxes, inducing households to increase saving. Also, precautionary saving
increases as the dispersion of future expected taxes rises the closer the government
debt stock moves to the fiscal limit. Non-linear model simulations reveal that the
households’ saving channel partially offsets fiscal deficits at high government debt-
to-GDP ratios, inducing a decline in the correlation of the fiscal balance and the
current account. The decline in the correlation of 0.15 is close to the change of the
correlation in the empirical analysis.
The results of this chapter suggest that households’ saving has an offsetting effect
on substantial and persistent fiscal deficits due to high sovereign risk premia. At
high government debt-to-GDP ratios households save more than at times when the
economy has a low government debt-to-GDP ratio. Therefore, our evidence — in line
with recent data for southern European countries — points to a potential rebalancing
of the current account as households increase saving, because of large fiscal deficits
that prevail due to high borrowing costs.
The recent global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis with their
severe macroeconomic effects have shown that state-dependent dynamics can be
important. Households and investors, but also central banks and governments face a
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higher uncertainty about the economy and ‘rare’ events such as the occurrence of
sovereign default are perceived to be much more likely. This chapter considers one
aspect of state-dependence and shows that the size of the government debt-to-GDP
ratio affects non-linear default risk premia and the co-movement of the fiscal balance
and the current account. Further areas in which state-dependent dynamics are likely
to play a crucial role are the size of fiscal multipliers and the effectiveness of austerity
programs.
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2.A Data description
Table 2.5: List of variables and definitions
Variable Source Description
Current account IMF WEO Current account balance (in % of GDP)
Fiscal balance IMF WEO Fiscal balance (in % of GDP). Net lend-
ing is calculated as revenue minus total
expenditure.
Government debt IMF WEO Government debt (in % of GDP). Gross
debt consists of all liabilities that re-
quire payment or payments of interest
and/or principal by the debtor to the
creditor.
Terms of trade IMF IFS Export price index divided by import
price index
Openness OECD Absolute value of exports plus absolute
value of imports (in % of GDP)
Relative income IMF WEO GDP per capita (PPP) relative to U.S.
GDP per capita (PPP)
Output gap IMF WEO Output gap (in % of potential GDP)
Change of total invest. IMF WEO Change of total investment (in % of
GDP)
Labor productivity OECD Labor productivity of the total economy
REER BIS Weighted average of bilateral exchange
rates adjusted by relative consumer
prices
Dependency ratio WDI Age dependency ratio (in % of working-
age population)
Data sources: IMF WEO: IMF World Economic Outlook (Oct 2012), IMF IFS: IMF Interna-
tional Financial Statistics (May 2012), OECD: OECD Economic Outlook No. 92 (Dec 2012),
BIS: Bank for International Settlements effective exchange rate indices: narrow indices (Jan
2013), World Bank WDI: World Bank Development Indicators (Jan 2013).
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Table 2.6: Summary statistics of dataset
Country T mean(CA/GDP ) mean(FB/GDP ) mean(Debt/GDP )
Austria 23 0.46 -2.75 63.1
Belgium 20 3.33 -2.70 109.4
Germany 16 2.47 -2.79 64.5
Denmark 13 2.68 1.24 51.7
Spain 31 -2.95 -3.41 46.6
Finland 31 1.41 1.01 33.9
France 31 0.12 -3.34 48.7
Great Britain 31 -1.41 -3.16 44.5
Greece 23 -6.01 -8.20 97.8
Ireland 31 -1.84 -4.52 68.7
Italy 22 -0.41 -5.83 108.1
The Netherlands 16 5.29 -1.73 58.2
Norway 31 6.31 7.25 41.3
Portugal 16 -4.84 -2.01 61.3
Sweden 18 5.11 -1.06 55.7
Notes: T: Maximum number of time periods available, CA/GDP : Current account in percent
of GDP, FB/GDP : Fiscal balance in percent of GDP, Debt/GDP : Government debt in
percent of GDP.
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2.B Empirical estimation
2.B.1 Data
The data set is an unbalanced panel of 15 European countries from 1980 to 2010.18
We include a broad set of control variables that potentially affect the current account.
In particular, along with the fiscal balance the baseline specification includes the
terms of trade, openness, relative income to the U.S. economy, output gap (in
percent of potential GDP), the change in total investment (in percent of GDP),
labor productivity (of the total economy), the real effective exchange rate and the
dependency ratio (in percent of working-age population). Detailed information about
the data set is given in Appendix 2.A.
2.B.2 Methodology
We estimate a dynamic panel threshold model of the form
yit = µi + χyi,t−1 + β1zitI(qit ≤ γ) + β2zitI(qit > γ) + α′xit + uit, (2.B.1)
where subscript i = 1, ..., N represents the country and subscript t = 1, ..., T
denotes the time period. yit is the dependent variable, µi is the country specific fixed
effect and yi,t−1 is an endogenous regressor. zit is a vector of explanatory regressors,
I(·) is an indicator function indicating the regime defined by the threshold variable
qit, and γ is the threshold level. Thus, the impact of zit on yit can potentially vary
depending on whether the threshold variable qit is below or above the threshold.
The threshold level γ splits the sample into two regimes, allowing for the estimation
of the regime-dependent impact of zit as measured by the coefficients β1 and β2.
Furthermore, xit contains a set of explanatory regressors which are independent of
the threshold. The error term uit is independent and identically distributed with
mean zero and finite variance.
Our estimation strategy follows Kremer et al. (2013) who overcome several econo-
metric challenges. In particular, they combine the estimation methods of non-dynamic
18The sample includes the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and
Sweden.
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panel threshold models in Hansen (1999) with the estimation strategy in Caner and
Hansen (2004) that applies to cross-sectional threshold models with endogenous
regressors. Hansen (1999) provides a method to estimate threshold effects in non-
dynamic panel models where all regressors have to be exogenous. To eliminate the
fixed effects mean differencing is applied. However, in a dynamic panel model as
considered in equation (2.B.1) mean differencing potentially leads to inconsistent
estimates as the lagged dependent variable will always be correlated with the mean of
the individual errors and, thus, with all transformed individual errors (see Arellano,
2003, p. 17). Caner and Hansen (2004) develop an estimator and an inference theory
for models with endogenous regressors and an exogenous threshold variable. Their
theory applies to cross-sectional data and therefore needs to be extended to the
estimation of panel data. For the endogenous regressor an instrumental variable
estimation is applied. Building on these two papers, Kremer et al. (2013) provide a
new, dynamic version of Hansen’s panel threshold model. As in Caner and Hansen
(2004) their procedure eliminates fixed effects with the forward orthogonal deviations
transformation suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995). Subtracting the average of all
future available observations of a variable avoids serial correlation of the transformed
errors.
For our empirical exercise we apply the dynamic panel threshold model to estimate
the relationship of the fiscal balance and the current account depending on the ratio
of government debt-to-GDP:
CAit = µi + χCAi,t−1 (2.B.2)
+ β1FBitI(DebtitGDPit ≤ γ) + β2FBitI(DebtitGDPit > γ) + α′xit + uit,
where the current account (CA) and the fiscal balance (FB) are measured in percent
of GDP. The threshold variable is the ratio of government debt-to-GDP. The set of
control variables xit includes the variables described above.
Following previous literature (e.g. Bussière et al., 2006), we include the lagged
current account as a regressor in the baseline specification. We instrument for
CAi,t−1 using lagged variables (CAi,t−3, CAi,t−4 and CAi,t−5). Employing few lags
prevents overfitting the predicted variable and reduces a possible bias of the coefficient
estimates. However, as there is a trade-off between bias and efficiency in small samples,
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using only few lags comes at the cost of loosing efficiency. To assess the importance
of the number of lags included we repeat the estimation using all of the available lags
and find that the results are very close to the baseline results (see Appendix 2.B.6).
2.B.3 Further empirical results
The first column of Table 2.7 reports the results of our baseline specification. The
key results are discussed in Section 2.2.2 in the main text.
The terms of trade have a significant, positive coefficient (0.05). An increase in
the terms of trade reflects that the prices of the export goods increase relative to
the prices of the import goods. The positive coefficient is consistent with a positive
relationship between national savings and a terms of trade improvement. The partial
correlation of openness (defined as imports plus exports in percent of GDP) with
the current account is very small and insignificant (-0.01). The estimated coefficient
of the relative income to the U.S. has a positive sign (0.01) which might reflect
higher investment and borrowing in poorer countries due to either a catch-up effect or
higher expected future income. The coefficient is, however, insignificant which is not
surprising given that the considered countries all have an income level comparable
to the one of the U.S. economy. The output gap co-moves negatively (-0.28) with
the current account. A country experiencing an economic expansion would therefore,
ceteris paribus, experience a deterioration of the current account which indicates
that the positive impact of higher saving is overcompensated by higher investment
inflows. As expected from the current account identity a change of investment is
associated with a decline (-0.14) of the current account. The coefficient for labor
productivity is insignificant (0.04), while the coefficient of the real effective exchange
rate is negative (-0.06). The significant positive coefficient (0.16) of the dependency
ratio could be explained by lower investment in countries which have a larger share
of the population out of the labor force.
We also estimate a non-dynamic panel model (see right column of Table 2.7) to
compare our results to previous studies. The threshold estimate in the non-dynamic
model is slightly higher than in the dynamic model. While we confirm our previous
finding that the partial correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account is
lower at high government debt levels, we find that both estimated coefficients are
larger compared to the estimates of the dynamic model. These results also highlight
87
Chapter 2
Table 2.7: Estimation results
Variable Dynamic panel Non-dynamic panel
Current account (t− 1) 0.59***
(0.16)
Fiscal balance (Debt/GDP ≤ γˆ) 0.16** 0.43***
(0.07) (0.06)
Fiscal balance (Debt/GDP > γˆ) -0.04 -0.01
(0.05) (0.06)
Terms of trade 0.05*** 0.09***
(0.02) (0.02)
Openness -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02)
Relative income to U.S. 0.01 0.08
(0.04) (0.06)
Output gap -0.28*** -0.67***
(in % of potential GDP) (0.11) (0.07)
Change of total investment -0.14 0.12
(in % of GDP) (0.08) (0.08)
Labor productivity 0.04 0.09***
(0.03) (0.03)
Real effective exchange rate -0.06*** -0.10***
(0.02) (0.02)
Dependency ratio 0.16** 0.37***
(% of working-age pop.) (0.08) (0.09)
Threshold estimate (in % of GDP) γˆ = 71.8 γˆ = 75.0
95 % confidence region [69.4− 75.0] [69.4− 91.05]
Total number of observations 353 353
Dependent Variable: Current account (t). */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent
level. Standard errors in brackets. The threshold of 71.8% (75.0%) splits the sample into 260
(271) obs. below and 93 (82) obs. above the threshold. The current account and the fiscal
balance are measured in percent of GDP.
the importance of including the lagged current account in our baseline estimation.
Compared to the non-dynamic panel the high persistence of the current account and
the lower regime-dependent estimates in the dynamic panel model suggest that our
baseline specification corrects for a potential bias due to omitting an endogenous
regressor.
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2.B.4 Robustness
We estimate a range of alternative specifications to confirm and extend our baseline
estimation results. First, we estimate the model for the period 1980 to 2007, excluding
the period from 2008 to 2010. The financial crisis with its strong influence on average
debt levels, fiscal balances and current accounts could potentially affect our estimation
results. Second, we re-estimate the model excluding countries with very high or low
government debt-to-GDP ratios.
Excluding the financial crisis period we estimate the same government debt-to-GDP
threshold of 71.8 percent (see first column of Table 2.8). The coefficients for the control
variables are close to those of our baseline results. The exclusion of the financial
crisis period slightly affects the estimate of the fiscal balance: The estimate below
the threshold increases from 0.16 to 0.30 and at the same time becomes statistically
more significant. The estimate at a high government debt-to-GDP ratio decreases
from -0.04 to -0.21. Thus, the difference between the state-dependent coefficients
of the fiscal balance becomes larger when excluding the financial crisis episode. In
comparison to the baseline results household saving therefore compensates a fiscal
deficit less in the low debt regime. The exclusion of the crisis period confirms our
baseline results: households become more Ricardian at high government debt levels,
increasingly compensating the impact of fiscal deficits on the current account by
higher household saving.
In a second robustness check we exclude the country with the lowest and several
countries with a high average government debt-to-GDP ratio from our sample (see
Table 2.8). These countries might influence the estimation results as a majority of
their observations are assigned to only one of the two debt regimes. Finland is the
country with the lowest average government debt-to-GDP ratio, while there are three
countries with relatively high average debt-to-GDP ratios: Belgium, Greece and Italy.
We exclude one country at a time. Excluding Belgium (the country with the highest
average debt-to-GDP ratio) yields the same estimated threshold of 71.8 percent and
the exclusion is inconsequential for the estimation results. Excluding Italy or Finland
also yields the same estimated thresholds and similar coefficient estimates as in the
baseline estimation. The threshold estimate is slightly larger when excluding Greece,
but the point estimates are very similar to the results of the complete sample.
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Table 2.8: Robustness
Variable Subperiod Excluding Excluding Excluding Excluding
1980-2007 Belgium Italy Greece Finland
CA (t− 1) 0.44*** 0.56*** 0.59*** 0.62*** 0.50***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.17)
Fiscal balance 0.30*** 0.17** 0.20** 0.17** 0.23***
(Debt/GDP ≤ γˆ) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Fiscal balance -0.21** -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.08
(Debt/GDP > γˆ) (0.09) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Terms of trade 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Openness 0.004 0.005 0.001 -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Relative income -0.01 0.004 -0.01 0.02 0.04
to U.S. (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Output gap -0.49*** -0.30*** -0.32*** -0.27** -0.38***
(in % of pot. GDP) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Change of total inv. -0.13 -0.13 -0.17** -0.17** -0.20**
(in % of GDP) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
Labor productivity 0.07** 0.03 0.04* 0.04 0.05*
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Real effective -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.04** -0.05*** -0.04*
exchange rate (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Dependency ratio (in % 0.25*** 0.19** 0.22** 0.19** 0.22**
of working-age pop.) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Threshold (% of GDP) γˆ = 71.8 γˆ = 71.8 γˆ = 71.8 γˆ = 86.9 γˆ = 71.8
95 % confidence region [69.4-74.1] [69.4-75.0] [69.4-75.0] [82.3-91.05] [69.4-88.0]
Total number of obs. 308 333 331 330 322
Dependent Variable: Current account (t). */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent
level. Standard errors in brackets. The current account and the fiscal balance are measured in
percent of GDP.
2.B.5 Discussion of related empirical literature
A number of papers estimate the medium-term relationship between the fiscal
balance and the current account estimating panel models without threshold. Chinn
and Prasad (2003) estimate a static panel for a large set of 88 countries for the sample
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ranging from 1971 to 1995 and find a significant point estimate for the fiscal balance
coefficient of 0.3. Chinn and Ito (2007) report a point estimate of around 0.15 for both
a sample of 89 countries as well as for a sub-sample of industrialized countries from
1971 to 2004. Gruber and Kamin (2007) report a value of 0.11 using a longer time
span but fewer countries (61) than Chinn and Prasad (2003). The panel estimation
of 21 OECD countries in Bussière et al. (2010) yields a significant, positive point
estimate of 0.14. Bussière et al. (2006) employ various estimators (LSDV, IV and
GMM) to a dynamic panel and find a positive relationship between the fiscal balance
and the current account ranging from 0.06 to 0.25. The estimation is based on data
for 21 OECD countries for a sample from 1980 to 2003. Their paper also finds a
highly significant coefficient for the lagged current account. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2012) estimate a static panel for 65 economies for a large sample ranging from 1969
to 2008 finding a highly significant positive fiscal balance coefficient of 0.24. Based
on these studies there exists compelling evidence for a small, positive relationship of
the fiscal balance and the current account. Studies that estimate a dynamic model
find a high persistence of the lagged current account comparable to our estimation
results. Estimating our dynamic panel model without a threshold we also find that
there is a positive relationship between the current account and the fiscal balance.
In a related study Röhn (2010) finds for a panel of 16 OECD countries that
increasing private saving offsets a deficit financed rise in public spending the higher
the level of public debt. This implies that consumers become more Ricardian with
growing levels of public debt. The findings of Röhn (2010) are consistent with the
fact that the correlation of the fiscal balance and the current account declines with
rising government debt levels as increasing household saving offsets the negative effect
of government deficits on the current account at high public debt levels.
Our results corroborate those of Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2008) who find that
the relationship between the fiscal balance and the current account depends on the
government debt-to-GDP ratio. Using a sample of eleven Euro area countries for
the years 1981 to 2005 they obtain a significant positive coefficient of 0.36 for the
estimate of the fiscal balance for the low debt regime. For the high debt regime the
estimate is -0.61 but it is not statistically different from zero. They also estimate a
sample of 22 industrialized countries and obtain an estimate for the fiscal balance
coefficient of 0.45 (significant) and -0.11 (not significant) for the low and high debt
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regime, respectively. In difference to the estimation strategy used in our study, the
results of Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2008) are based on the estimation and inference
theory for non-dynamic panels by Hansen (1999).19 Due to the high persistence of
the current account the estimates of Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2008) are potentially
biased. Applying the dynamic version of Hansen’s model proposed by Kremer et al.
(2013), we avoid this problem. We obtain consistent estimates that are smaller
than those of Nickel and Vansteenkiste (2008), but we confirm the regime-dependent
influence of government debt-to-GDP ratios on the correlation of the fiscal balance
and the current account.
19These authors use a different sample of countries and analyze a shorter time span.
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2.B.6 Additional estimation results
Table 2.9: Estimation results using all available lags
Variable Coefficient Std. Error
Current account (t− 1) 0.56*** (0.09)
Fiscal balance (Debt/GDP ≤ 71.8%) 0.17*** (0.05)
Fiscal balance (Debt/GDP > 71.8%) -0.04 (0.04)
Terms of trade 0.05*** (0.01)
Openness −0.01 (0.01)
Relative income to U.S. 0.01 (0.04)
Output gap (in % of potential GDP) −0.30*** (0.07)
Change of total investment (in % of GDP) −0.12* (0.07)
Labor productivity 0.04* (0.02)
Real effective exchange rate −0.06*** (0.02)
Dependency ratio (% of working-age pop.) 0.17** (0.07)
Threshold estimate (in % of GDP) γˆ = 71.8
99 % confidence region [69.4− 88.0]
Total number of observations 353
Dependent Variable: Current account (t). */**/*** indicate significance at the 10/5/1 percent
level. Standard errors in brackets. The threshold of 71.8% splits the sample into 260 observations
below and 93 observations above the threshold. The current account and the fiscal balance
are measured in percent of GDP. We use the largest available number of lags for the current
account as instruments for the lagged current account.
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2.C Non-linear model equilibrium conditions
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2.D Non-linear computational method
1. Policy rules. To solve the non-linear model we use the monotone map method
that is described in Coleman (1991) and Davig (2004). First, we discretize the
state space for each state variable, i.e. Ψt =
{
bdt , d
H
t−1, At, zt, SZ,t
}
. Second, we
solve a simplified version of the model without default (δ = 0) with a first-order
approximation and use these policy functions to generate an initial set of decision
rules denoted by bdt = f bj (Ψt) and dHt = fdj (Ψt). These rules are substituted into
the two core equations of the model (the Euler equations (2.3.22) and (2.3.23)).
Numerical integration is used to evaluate expectations about future variables.
Solving this system for the state variables at each grid point yields updated
values for the decision rules, i.e. bdt = f bj+1(Ψt) and dHt = fdj+1(Ψt) which we
use as a new guess to substitute into (2.3.22) and (2.3.23). We repeatedly
update the decision rules until the decision rules converge at every grid point in
the state space i.e. |f bj (Ψt)− f bj+1(Ψt)| <  and |fdj (Ψt)− fdj+1(Ψt)| < , where
 = 10−6. We obtain a solution of the non-linear model on our grid points.
Using the decision rules f b(Ψt) and fd
H (Ψt) of the model, we can solve for the
remaining variables.
2. Simulation results. Given the policy rules we simulate the model economy. We
initialize the simulation in the ergodic mean for all variables and then feed
in various shock sequences for our exogenous processes. Given these shock
sequences, we evaluate the evolution of the endogenous states using linear
interpolation. In each period we randomly draw the effective fiscal limit from
the state-dependent distribution of the fiscal limit. The government defaults on
the fraction δ when its debt stock exceeds the effective fiscal limit.
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The macroeconomic effects of monetary
policy: a new measure for the United
Kingdom
3.1 Introduction
The efficacy of monetary policy has often been the subject of heated debate and
despite considerable research in the academic literature there remains disagreement
about its effect on the macroeconomy. A range of empirical estimates have emerged
in the literature and the effects on prices and output tend to be between 0.5 and 1 per
cent. A notable exception — the so-called narrative method pioneered by Romer and
Romer (2004) (RR) — has found large effects.1 To our knowledge, and despite the
attention given to these results, there are no other applications of this methodology
to identify monetary policy shocks. In addition, much of the research has focused on
the United States and results for other countries such as the United Kingdom are
sparse. This chapter fills both these gaps, providing new narrative-based estimates of
the effect of monetary policy in the United Kingdom.
We focus on the effect of changes in the central bank’s policy interest rate rather
than on unconventional measures. Whilst the effect of unconventional measures is
clearly an important topic in its own right, it seems likely that interest rates will
remain a key policy instrument once economies are able to move away from the zero
1This approach follows earlier work using a slightly different narrative identification strategy in
Romer and Romer (1989). Narrative approaches have also been employed to identify tax shocks
(Romer and Romer, 2010; Cloyne, 2013) and government spending shocks (Ramey and Shapiro,
1998; Ramey, 2011).
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lower bound. Furthermore, looking at changes in policy interest rates is important for
understanding the effects of monetary policy in the past and to be comparable with
the existing literature. The effect of interest rates on the macroeconomy therefore
remains of considerable interest, both to macroeconomists and policymakers.
Identifying the effects of changes in monetary policy requires confronting at least
three econometric issues. First, monetary policy instruments, interest rates, and other
macroeconomic variables are determined simultaneously as policymakers respond to
macroeconomic fluctuations and intend their decisions to affect the economy. Second,
policymakers are likely to react to expected future economic conditions as well as
current and past information. Third, policymakers base their decisions on real-time
data, not ex-post data often used in other empirical studies.
A major advantage of the Romer and Romer (2004) approach is that we can directly
tackle all three of these empirical challenges. First we need to disentangle cyclical
movements in short-term market interest rates from policymakers’ intended changes
in the policy target rate. A major advantage of employing the approach to the United
Kingdom (U.K.) is that the Bank of England’s policy rate — Bank Rate2 — is the
intended policy target rate. We therefore do not need to construct the implied policy
target rate from central bank minutes as in RR. As a second step, the target rate
series is purged of discretionary policy changes that were responding to the changes in
macroeconomic variables within the policymakers’ information set. This information
set may include real-time data and forecasts that determine the policy reaction to
anticipated economic conditions. We therefore use historical sources to reconstruct a
proxy for the information set on which policy decisions were made. Specifically we
construct an extensive new data set of historical Bank of England forecasts, private
sector forecasts and real-time data.
In general many studies in the literature rely on ex-post data which were not the
data actually available to policymakers at the time of their decision. Orphanides (2001)
has shown that this can significantly affect estimates of the response of monetary
policy to macroeconomic variables. Since our data are real-time, we naturally address
this concern.
We perform a first stage regression to purge the intended policy target rate of
2Previously Bank Rate was also referred to as Minimum Lending Rate / Repo Rate / Official Bank
Rate.
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systematic policy changes, producing a new policy shock series. We then use this
new shock measure in a range of second stage regressions to analyse the effects of a
shock to monetary policy.
Based on our new shock measure, we find that a 100 basis points increase in
the policy target rate leads to a peak decline in output of 0.6 per cent3 and a 0.8
percentage point fall in inflation. These magnitudes are more in line with evidence
from conventional vector autoregressive (VAR) models. However, unlike many VAR-
based studies, and in keeping with RR for the U.S. economy, we find a negative,
significant and theoretically plausible response for inflation and prices. Investigating
this issue further we find that including forecast data in our methodology is crucial
for delivering a negative response of prices and inflation.4
Commonly employed VAR studies, among these Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(1996, 1999), are often based on a recursiveness assumption with the policy instrument
(typically interest rates) ordered last. Intuitively, this identification strategy allows
all variables to contemporaneously affect interest rates, but interest rates have a
lagged effect on the other macroeconomic variables. In response to a 100 basis point
contractionary monetary policy shock, these studies typically find an effect on output
of around 0.5 to 1 per cent at the peak and similar for inflation.5 However, there is
often a sizable short-term increase in prices in response to a monetary tightening
— the “price puzzle”, first documented in Sims (1992) — which has lead some to
question the result. Using the common recursive VAR approach, we also find a large
price puzzle for the U.K. economy. The price puzzle remains even after controlling
for commodity prices, oil prices and exchange rates.
Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz (2005) argue that typical VARs use too narrow
information sets. These authors use factor augmented VARs (FAVARs) to exploit a
wide range of U.S. data, finding a peak decline in GDP of 0.6 per cent and of prices
by 0.7 per cent. Mumtaz, Zabczyk, and Ellis (2011) estimate a FAVAR model for
3As measured by monthly industrial production. For quarterly GDP the peak effect is -0.4 per
cent.
4Castelnuovo and Surico (2010) show that including forecast data can resolve the U.S. price puzzle
in VARs. They argue this is necessary in periods of indeterminacy, where policy did not respect
the Taylor Principle.
5For the U.S. economy Christiano et al. (1999) find a decline in industrial production of 0.7 per
cent and a peak decline in prices of 0.6 per cent. For the U.K. economy Dedola and Lippi (2005)
find a drop in industrial production of 0.5 per cent and an insignificant price response.
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the U.K., finding a maximum GDP decrease of 0.5 per cent and a price level decline
of up to 2 per cent.6 An advantage of our approach is that forecasts can be seen as
summary statistics of the policymakers’ information set. Consequently, this approach
does not require the large data sets, many of which are only available at a quarterly
frequency.
Another strand of the literature, following Uhlig (2005), has proposed using sign-
restrictions on the impact responses. Specifically, a contractionary monetary policy
shock is assumed to lower prices and output on impact. For a 100 bps monetary
contraction, Uhlig (2005) finds a GDP peak decrease of 0.8 per cent and a maximum
price decline of 0.4 per cent for the U.S. economy. The results in Mountford (2005)
for the U.K. economy are moderate with a maximum GDP drop of 0.6 per cent and
a decline in the GDP deflator of 0.15 per cent. One disadvantage of this approach
is that the impulse responses are only set-identified. In our approach, we are also
agnostic about the direction of the effects of monetary policy.
In contrast to the more moderate effects discussed above, Romer and Romer (2004)
find that a 100 basis point monetary tightening in the U.S. has a peak effect on
output ranging from around -1.6 to -4.6 per cent and nearly -6.0 per cent on the level
of producer prices. Coibion (2012) has recently argued that these effects may be
overstated, but still finds effects of several percentage points. As noted, these results
are large and the magnitudes naturally raise two questions. First, is there something
inherent in this ‘narrative’ approach that produces large effects? Second — and more
fundamentally — are the effects of monetary policy large or small? It is therefore
interesting that our narrative-based effects for the U.K. are less pronounced than the
larger effects found by RR for the U.S. economy.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 addresses
the econometric challenges in more detail and presents our new real-time database.
Section 3.3 estimates our new shock measures and investigates its properties. Section
3.4 presents our baseline results. Section 3.5 shows that our results are robust to
a variety of different specifications. This section also shows that forecast data are
important for our results and examines sub-samples. Section 3.6 concludes.
6The GDP effect is similar across the two sub-samples. The price response, however, is considerably
smaller in the 1975-1991 sample at around -0.5 per cent at the peak.
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3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Identification and the first stage regression
In estimating the effects of monetary policy the researcher needs to overcome at least
three econometric challenges. First, interest rates and other macroeconomic variables
(e.g. output, inflation) are determined simultaneously, generating an identification
problem. Second, policymakers are likely not only to react to the current state
of the economy, but also to anticipated future macroeconomic conditions. Third,
policymakers base their decision on real-time data, whereas many studies employ
final revised data.
More formally, we aim to isolate shocks mt from the systematic movements in the
intended policy variable St in the following equation:
St = f(Ωt) +mt . (3.2.1)
The systematic component of St is driven by the policymakers’ response to data in
their information set Ωt, where f(·) is a function capturing the systematic reaction
and the shock term mt reflects unexpected shifts in monetary policy.
The VAR literature has mainly tackled the simultaneity problem of interest rates and
macroeconomic fluctuations. Often this literature has imposed a timing restriction:
macroeconomic variables do not contemporaneously (within the period) react to
interest rates (e.g. Christiano et al., 1996, 1999). The equation of the VAR that
describes interest rates is therefore directly related to equation (3.2.1) above. Other
papers in the literature have used sign-restrictions — following Uhlig (2005) — to
identify mt. This method assumes that a contractionary monetary policy shock is
one that, for example, raises interest rates but lowers output and inflation on impact.
There are potentially many impact matrices that satisfy these restrictions and, as
such, the resulting impulse response functions are only set-identified.
Two further issues are often overlooked in commons approaches. First, forward-
looking policymakers may well include forecasts in their information set Ωt and central
banks devote a great deal of resources forecasting the future path of the economy.
Moreover, since contemporaneous estimates of the state of the economy are rarely
available in real-time, the policymakers’ forecasts also include a forecast of the current
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period. It is worth noting that, in practice, the forecasts may be based on additional
information and judgements not readily available to the econometrician.7
Second, since monetary policy responds to information available to policymakers
at the time of the decision, any regression designed to recover the policy shocks
mt should be based on the real-time data rather than ex-post revised data. As
noted, key papers in the existing literature, among these Christiano et al. (1999) and
Uhlig (2005), have employed ex-post data. Orphanides (2001, 2003) and Molodtsova,
Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy, and Papell (2008) show that estimated monetary policy reaction
functions based on ex-post revised data are considerably different when using real-time
data.8
We apply the Romer and Romer (2004) approach to identify monetary policy
shocks mt. Following the literature we refer to this as a narrative approach because
it makes careful use of historical documents to construct the intended policy target
rate and the information set of the policymakers prior to their decisions. The first
stage of this approach requires constructing a measure of the intended policy target
rate (St) at each policy decision. RR construct the target rate from minutes of the
Federal Open Market Committee meetings. One advantage of the U.K. monetary
framework is that the policy rate — Bank Rate — is the intended policy target.
Batini and Nelson (2009), in their extensive history of U.K. monetary policy, argue
that short-term interest rates have consistently been used as the policy instrument,
even in the periods where the government publicly emphasised money supply or
exchange rates.
Armed with a series for the intended policy rate we then estimate a first stage re-
gression addressing the econometric challenges discussed above. The precise regression
estimated is
∆im = α + βit−1 +
2∑
i=−1
γiyˆ
F
m,i +
2∑
i=−1
ϕipi
F
m,i (3.2.2)
+
2∑
i=−1
δi(yˆFm,i − yˆFm−1,i) +
2∑
i=−1
ϑi(piFm,i − piFm−1,i) +
3∑
i=1
ρiut−i + m ,
7If the policymakers’ forecasts were produced by the same VAR specification, including forecasts
may be unnecessary. However, we show forecasts make an important difference to the results,
suggesting that common VARs miss key information determining the policy decision.
8Ex-post data for some variables, such as real output growth, often turn out to differ substantially
from real-time estimates, as shown in Appendix 3.A.
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where the dependent variable is measured at a meeting-by-meeting frequency as
indicated by subscript m. The subscript i denotes the quarter of the forecast relative
to the meeting date and the subscript t− 1 refer to information from the previous
month, not information at the previous meeting. In particular we follow RR and
regress the change in the intended policy target (∆im) around the policy decision
(in practice, between two meetings) on the one and two quarter ahead forecasts of
real GDP growth (yˆFm,i) and inflation (piFm,i) as well as the real-time backdata of the
previous period and the forecast for the current period.9 We also include revisions
in the forecasts relative to the previous round of forecasts (e.g. yˆFm,i − yˆFm−1,i). In
addition, we control for recent economic conditions by including interest rates of
the previous month (it−1) and the unemployment rates of the previous three months
(ut−i). The residual m is our new monetary policy shock measure.10
It is also worth noting that in collecting forecast data for the U.K. economy
we are directly constructing a real-time data set to capture the information set of
policymakers at each period in time — addressing the issue raised by Orphanides
(2001) and others.
To include forecasts in a regression such as equation (3.2.1) they need to be
orthogonal to m. To achieve this, we carefully exploit the timing of forecast releases
to ensure they do not already include the effects of the relevant (subsequent) policy
change. We therefore aim to capture the information set of policymakers prior to the
policy decision. In our baseline specification for estimating the macroeconomic effects
of changes m, we employ the Cholesky decomposition used in RR and Coibion (2012).
These authors assume that the shocks affect the macroeconomy with a one month lag
and, for comparability, we initially follow these papers. However, since the forecasts
are carefully constructed to be orthogonal to m, our method should also allow us
to estimate the contemporaneous effect of changes in m on other macroeconomic
variables and we explore this issue in the robustness section.
Using forecast data to identify m also has a further advantage. In principle the
researcher may need to include a large number of time series in the VAR as many
variables could enter the information set Ω. This is the motivation behind the data-
rich FAVAR approach of Bernanke et al. (2005). Forecasts are particularly useful,
9The subscript m denotes the meeting date when interest rates are set. The subscript i denotes
the quarter of the forecast relative to the meeting date.
10Later we transform the residual into a monthly shock series denoted mt.
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however, because they neatly summarize a wider range of macroeconomic information,
as well as the anticipated movements in the macroeconomy.
The estimated residuals of the first stage regression are our new exogenous monetary
policy shock measure. Our definition of a monetary policy ‘shock’ therefore captures
an unpredictable surprise that is not taken in response to information about current
and future economic developments.11 As such, the ‘shock’ reflects an unpredictable
surprise movement in the target variable and could represent a variety of factors
including deliberately induced policy surprises, over- and under-reactions or temporary
shifts in the preferences of policymakers.12 This new meeting-by-meeting measure
of monetary policy shocks is converted to a monthly series and, in second stage
regressions, is used to estimate the effect of monetary policy on the macroeconomy.
3.2.2 Data construction
As noted above, the official Bank Rate series serves as our intended policy target
rate. This is available from the Bank of England website.
Since 1997 the Bank of England has operational independence in setting interest
rates to meet an inflation target. To capture the information set of policymakers
the natural starting point is to use official Bank of England forecasts for inflation
and output growth. Since the Bank of England actually began inflation targeting in
1993, forecasts are available in the quarterly Inflation Report (IR) and the forecasts
themselves provide quarterly projections for several years ahead.13
The Bank of England publishes two sets of forecasts. One set is conditioned on a
constant interest rate path which ex-post includes the effect of the Monetary Policy
Committee’s (MPC) Bank Rate decision. The other set is conditioned on a path
11Given that the relevant endogeneity of the target rate is with respect to variables in the policy-
makers’ information set, the relevant forecasts are those of the policymakers. It may still be the
case that endogenous policy changes are surprises relative to the forecasts of the private sector.
We address this issue in the robustness section.
12An alternative approach used in the literature uses forward-looking financial market data to
construct monetary policy shocks as in Kuttner (2001); Faust, Swanson, and Wright (2004);
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005); Gürkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005); Barakchian and Crowe
(2010) and Wingender (2011) who use Federal Funds future contracts.
13Until 2003 the inflation target was defined in terms of the retail prices index excluding mortgage
interest payments (RPIX) — first as a band, then as a point target of 2.5 per cent at an annual
rate after 1997. After 2003 the inflation target was specified in terms of the consumer prices
index (CPI), with a target of 2 per cent annual rate.
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for Bank Rate implied by market interest rates prior to the meeting. As discussed
above, a crucial assumption to ensure identification is that forecasts do not contain
information about contemporaneous movements in the interest rate (in other words,
they do not take into account of the new policy decision and thus are uncorrelated
with the error term m). If the forecasts already included the effect of the policy
change the regression results would be biased. We therefore use the latter set of
forecasts and we assign these data to the relevant meeting of the MPC.14
Before 1997 monetary policy decisions were made by the U.K. Treasury. Official
Treasury forecasts were produced but only two per year are publicly available and the
published forecast is not detailed enough for our purposes. Furthermore, monetary
policy was not set at a regular meeting but was changed periodically as deemed
necessary. To tackle this problem we also collect forecasts produced by the National
Institute for Economic and Social Research (NIESR).15
Unlike forecasts from other professional bodies, NIESR forecasts are available for a
long time period, at a quarterly frequency and for a large number of possible variables
of interest. In addition, NIESR is Britain’s longest established independent economic
research institute, which is widely respected and close to the U.K. policy debate.
We collect NIESR forecasts for our full sample, even for periods when we have
Bank of England forecasts. The reason for doing so is twofold. First, we can confirm
that the NIESR and Bank of England Inflation Report forecasts are highly correlated
(at least for the two quarters ahead we use).16 Second, we are able to re-estimate
our results using only NIESR forecasts for the full sample. Later we show this makes
little difference to the results. NIESR forecasts therefore appear to be good proxies
for official forecasts. Moreover, new releases of NIESR forecasts have received much
attention in the media (e.g. the Financial Times) indicating that these are likely to
be known to the private sector and policymakers.
To address the possible endogeneity of forecasts to the policy change we collect all
the forecast embargo dates and finalisation dates from the historical hard-copies. We
14In addition, MPC minutes are published shortly after the Bank Rate decision, providing further
insights into the decision making process.
15Although in the baseline analysis we use Bank of England forecasts from 1993 to 1997 where
available, regarding them as a closer proxy for Treasury forecasts.
16The correlation between NIESR and Bank of England’s forecasts for inflation as well as real GDP
growth are at around 0.7 for up to two quarter ahead forecasts in the overlapping sample period
(1993Q1-2007Q4).
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also consult historical editions of the Financial Times archive to confirm the forecast
release date. We are therefore able to ensure that a forecast did not already contain
the effects of the relevant policy change.
All data pre-1991 have been manually digitised from the hard-copies of the National
Institute Economic Review. To illustrate the data source Figure 3.1 provides an
extract from the NIESR February 1983 issue of the National Institute Economic
Review. For example, we transform GDP forecasts in column ‘GDP Index 1975=100’
into quarterly growth rates of GDP.
Figure 3.1: Extract from National Institute Economic Review (Vol. 103)
 at ULB Bonn on July 16, 2012ner.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
We use forecast data for real GDP growth and inflation from our new data set. The
relevant inflation index varied over our sample. We therefore use the consumer prices
deflator (1975-87), retail prices index (RPI) (1987-92), retail prices index excluding
mortgages (1993-2003), and the harmonised consumer prices index (2003-07).
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As noted above, we use the forecast for the current period (real-time estimates of
the current period were rarely available to policymakers) and the forecasts for the
two quarters ahead. We collect the relevant real-time backdata, which may also differ
from the final revised series. These are available either from the forecast publications
themselves or the Bank of England’s real-time data set. Our new data set contains
170 potential variables at quarterly frequency from 1975:1 to 2007:4, although not all
variables are used in this study. We exclude the most recent years after 2007 when
interest rates were maintained close to the zero lower bound. This is a rich data
set, which should also prove useful for future research (for details see Table 3.6 in
Appendix 3.A).
Since our first stage regression is conducted at a decision-by-decision frequency,
the new real-time forecast data set is carefully matched to relevant Bank Rate de-
cisions. In the first part of our sample Bank Rate is changed infrequently, whereas
meetings are held on a monthly basis after 1997. Table 3.1 illustrates the con-
struction of our data set using both sources — Bank of England forecasts and
NIESR forecasts. The first column lists the date of the Bank Rate decision and
the second column specifies the contemporaneous quarter. Forecasts are denoted by
FSource[Forecast quarter, Forecast year]Publication date , where we distinguish between the source
(IR/NIESR), the quarter and the year the forecast was produced for, and the forecast
publication date.17
A complication we face is that we do not have new forecasts for every Bank Rate
decision as policy meetings take place at higher frequency: there are more Bank Rate
decisions than forecast releases. This is also true, although to a lesser degree, in RR.
There are a few possible ways to deal with this issue. One option is to only consider
Bank Rate changes after a new quarterly release of forecasts (and exclude all other
changes). However, this procedure reduces the number of observations substantially.
Alternatively we could assign the latest available forecast to that meeting, while still
controlling for developments between the last forecast and the policy decision, for
17As noted, Bank of England forecasts are officially published after the Bank Rate decision they
were prepared for. For example, the Bank Rate decision on 6th May 1997 was based on Bank
of England forecasts published on 13th May 1997. We assign the 1997Q2 forecast to the
contemporaneous quarter, i.e. yˆm,i, since it is conditioned on the market path about interest
rates prior to the policy announcement. NIESR forecasts released after the policy decision would
be endogenous. Therefore, NIESR forecasts are assigned to the Bank Rate decision that is
subsequently implemented.
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Table 3.1: Assignment of forecasts to Bank Rate decisions
Bank
Rate
Current
quarter
yˆFm,t−1 yˆ
F
m,t yˆ
F
m,t+1 yˆ
F
m,t − yˆFm−1,t
15/03/83 Q1 83 FN [Q4,82]24−02−83 FN [Q1,83]24−02−83 FN [Q2,83]24−02−83 FN [Q1,83]24−02−83 −FN [Q1,83]30−11−82
...
06/05/97 Q2 97 F IR[Q1,97]13−05−97 F IR[Q2,97]13−05−97 F IR[Q3,97]13−05−97 F IR[Q2,97]13−05−97 −F IR[Q2,97]12−02−97
06/06/97 Q2 97 F IR[Q1,97]13−05−97 F IR[Q2,97]13−05−97 F IR[Q3,97]13−05−97 F IR[Q2,97]13−05−97 −F IR[Q2,97]12−02−97
10/07/97 Q3 97 F IR[Q2,97]13−05−97 F IR[Q3,97]13−05−97 F IR[Q4,97]13−05−97 F IR[Q3,97]13−05−97 −F IR[Q3,97]12−02−97
Notes: Forecasts are F jm,m = Publication date, j = Source[Forecast quarter, Forecast year],
where we distinguish between the source (IR/NIESR), the quarter and the year the forecast was
prepared for (t), and the forecast publication date (m). The remaining variables are matched
following the same procedure indicated in this table.
example by including unemployment data.
A further issue arises in the earlier sample when we have a new forecast and no
change in policy but we do not know whether there was a meeting to decide to leave
the rate unchanged. We could either treat the forecast release itself as a decision to
keep the rate fixed in the face of new economic developments, or we could disregard
these cases.
Having carefully considered these options our preferred specification is to keep
all Bank Rate decisions and assign the latest available forecast to that decision.
However, we disregard the cases where new forecasts are available but we do not
observe a Bank Rate change (since we cannot be sure these are genuine monetary
policy decisions). This approach maintains a large number of observations and is
closest to the implementation in RR.
3.3 The new shock measure
3.3.1 Stage 1: stripping out the systematic component
After assigning the real-time forecast data to Bank Rate decisions, we isolate
innovations to Bank Rate that are orthogonal to the real-time information set of
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policymakers that we consider. We include all Bank Rate changes between 1975
and 2007 except those taking place at very high frequency (i.e. within the same two
weeks). The sample covers 235 Bank Rate decisions.
Table 3.2 reports the results from estimating equation (3.2.2). The estimation
results indicate that U.K. monetary policy was conducted countercyclically over the
sample. Summing up the coefficients on the real GDP growth forecasts yields 0.17
for the level and 0.23 for the change in the growth forecast. Thus, a one percentage
point increase in the real GDP growth forecast from one forecast release to the next
leads to an increase in Bank Rate of 40 basis points. The effect on Bank Rate is
comparable to the U.S. results of RR, who find a response of 29 basis points in the
intended target rate. The response to a one percentage point increase in the inflation
rate forecast leads to a rise in Bank Rate of 33 basis points, of which 3 basis points
are due to the absolute change in inflation forecasts and 30 basis points are due to
the change relative to the last forecast release. The policy target rate in the U.K.
reacts stronger (30 basis points) than the intended Federal Funds rate in the U.S.
(which increases by 7 basis points) to a one percentage point change in inflation rate
forecasts. A one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate in each of the
past three months keeping everything else equal reduces the policy target rate by
around 5 basis points in the U.K. economy. The same effect is found in the U.S. study
in response to a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate forecast of
the current quarter.
In summary, the point estimates for the U.K. and those for the U.S. in RR, although
not identical, are qualitatively similar. The results in Table 3.2 also appear to have
reasonable and expected signs and magnitudes. Importantly, having stripped out the
systematic component of policy, the residual of equation (3.2.2) is our new measure
of monetary policy changes orthogonal to the information set of policymakers.
3.3.2 Properties of the new shock series
We now transform the first stage residuals into a monthly series of monetary policy
shocks that we use to estimate the macroeconomic effects of changes in monetary
policy. Note that the residuals from the first stage regression are dated according to
the policy decision (given that we have the exact date of the decision). We therefore
transform the residuals into a monthly series as follows. In a month without a Bank
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Table 3.2: Determinants of the change in Bank Rate
Variable Coefficient Standard error
Constant (α) -0.231 0.288
Initial Bank Rate (it−1) -0.006 0.027
Forecasted output growth (yˆFm,i),
Quarters ahead:
-1 0.009 0.036
0 0.073∗ 0.042
1 0.066 0.049
2 0.019 0.061
Forecasted inflation (pˆiFm,i),
Quarters ahead:
-1 0.114∗ 0.067
0 -0.167 0.107
1 -0.025 0.108
2 0.110 0.077
Change in forecasted output growth (yˆFm,i − yˆFm−1,i),
Quarters ahead:
-1 0.062∗∗ 0.031
0 0.060∗ 0.034
1 0.027 0.042
2 0.080 0.050
Change in forecasted inflation (piFm,i − piFm−1,i),
Quarters ahead:
-1 0.057 0.118
0 0.386∗∗ 0.187
1 -0.243 0.174
2 0.102 0.103
Change in unemployment rate (ut−i),
Months:
-1 -1.067∗∗ 0.511
-2 0.488 0.821
-3 0.534 0.507
Dependent variable: Change in policy target rate ∆im. ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ indicate significance at 10/5/1
per cent level. R2 = 0.28, D.W. = 1.86, F-Statistic = 4.22, N = 235. Sample covers all Bank
Rate changes over the period 1975M3 to 2007M12 that are at least two weeks apart. The
regression is based on: ∆im = α + βit−1 +
∑2
i=−1 γiyˆ
F
m,i +
∑2
i=−1 ϕipi
F
m,i +
∑2
i=−1 δi(yˆFm,i −
yˆFm−1,i) +
∑2
i=−1 ϑi(piFm,i − piFm−1,i) +
∑3
i=1 ρiut−i + m .
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Rate decision we set the observation to zero. Otherwise we assign the shock to the
respective month in which the policy change occurred. For months with multiple
policy changes, we sum the shocks. Figure 3.2 displays our new monthly series of
exogenous monetary policy shocks. As above, we denote the monthly shock series by
mt.18
Figure 3.2: New monthly U.K. monetary policy shock series
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The shock series is more volatile in the first half of the sample until 1993. This
observation fits well with the view that there was a regime change around 1993. Since
October 1992 the Bank of England explicitly targets inflation. The policy making
process also has become more transparent due to regular publications of the Inflation
Report (since 1993) and MPC Minutes (since 1997). It is therefore interesting that
we find a decrease in the shock volatility. Since the independence of the Bank of
England in 1997 we find no large surprise monetary policy shocks.19 In the robustness
section we examine results for the post-92 sub-sample.
18We find no evidence of serial correlation in the residuals based on the ACF/PACF correlogram at
a 1% significance level.
19Larger shocks in the first part of the sample also might reflect that the average level of Bank Rate
was higher than in the second part of the sample. See also Figure 3.10 in Appendix 3.B for a
comparison of the exogenous Bank Rate path compared to the average Bank Rate.
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3.3.3 Predictability of the monetary shock series
Our constructed monthly shock series should, in principle, be unpredictable from
movements in ex-post revised data. Before proceeding, it is worth confirming this
using a series of Granger causality tests. Specifically, we regress the monetary
shocks mt on a set of lagged macroeconomic variables including industrial production,
unemployment rate and inflation:
mt = c+
I∑
i=1
βixt−i + ut . (3.3.3)
The null hypothesis is that our shock series is not predictable from lags of these
macroeconomic variables. Table 3.3 reports F-statistics and P-values from estimating
equation (3.3.3). We cannot statistically reject the hypothesis of unpredictability,
Table 3.3: Predictability of monetary policy shocks
Variable F-statistics P-values
Change in industrial production 1.31 0.21
Monthly inflation rate 0.79 0.67
Unemployment rate 1.05 0.40
Notes: The table reports F-statistics and P-values for the null hypothesis that all coefficients
βi are equal to zero. In each regression we include twelve monthly lags (I = 12).
with P-values in Table 3.3 all above 20 per cent. These tests suggest that our shock
measure is indeed not predictable.20
In contrast to our U.K. results, Coibion (2012) finds that the monetary shock
series for the U.S. is predictable in the full sample. The U.S. series only becomes
unpredictable after excluding the period in which the Federal Reserve abandoned
targeting the Federal Funds rate. However, our results are consistent with the reading
of U.K. monetary history by Batini and Nelson (2009): despite historical episodes
during which U.K. policymakers emphasised the role of monetary aggregates and
exchange rates, short-term interest rates remained a key policy instrument.
20The shock series is also not predictable at a 10 per cent significance level when including the
contemporaneous value of xt, as in Coibion (2012).
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3.4 The effects of monetary policy
Armed with our new measure of monetary policy shocks, we estimate the effects on
output, inflation and unemployment for the sample from 1975M3 to 2007M12. First,
we estimate a vector autoregressive (VAR) model following Romer and Romer (2004)
and Coibion (2012). In practice VARs are widely used in empirical macroeconomics.
As noted in Coibion, Gorodnichenko, Kueng, and Silvia (2012), including the lagged
dependent variable and controlling for other shocks may yield more precise estimates
in shorter samples. We also include our monetary shock as an endogenous variable
in the VAR to control for the possibility of any residual endogeneity of the shock
measure with respect to the ex-post revised data. Later we estimate single equation
regressions used in RR and confirm our main results.
3.4.1 Empirical specification
In our baseline specification we follow Christiano et al. (1999) and Coibion (2012)
using five macroeconomic variables: the log of output as measured by industrial
production (seasonally adjusted) (yt), the unemployment rate (ut), the 12m rate of
the retail prices index excluding mortgage interest payments (pit), a log commodity
price index (seasonally adjusted) (compt), and our new measure of monetary policy
shocks. Data definitions are given in Appendix 3.A. We estimate the effects of
monetary policy based on the following VAR:
X t = A0 +A1t+B(L)X t−1 + t , (3.4.4)
where B(L) is a lag polynomial with P lags. The vector of observables is X t =
[yt, pit, compt, ut, cum.shockt]′.
Since conventional VARs are based on interest rates in levels (Bank Rate for the
U.K.) we follow Romer and Romer (2004) and Coibion (2012), cumulate our new
shock series (cum.shockt =
∑t
i=0mi) and order this series last in the VAR. This
ordering is equivalent to assuming that the other variables in the VAR do not react
within the month to a change in policy.21 The data are monthly and we estimate the
VAR with P = 24 lags. The VAR in RR includes 36 lags and their single equation
21Estimating a monthly VAR as we do, the assumption is less restrictive when compared with
quarterly VARs but, as noted earlier, we relax this assumption later.
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regressions are based on including lags of at least two years. We prefer to include
two years of lags to estimate fewer parameters. We also experimented with different
values for P and show that the results are robust (as shown in the Appendix). All
figures below report impulse responses together with 68 and 95 per cent bootstrapped
confidence intervals using 2,000 replications.22
3.4.2 Results
Figure 3.3 presents the main result of this chapter. In response to a 100 basis
points (bps) increase in the monetary policy target rate, the inflation rate falls by up
to -0.77 percentage points.23 Industrial production has a peak decline of -0.57 per
cent and the unemployment rate peaks at 0.19 percentage points. Inflation does not
react strongly on impact, but declines sharply 18 months after the shock, reaching
its peak effect after 33 months. The drop in industrial production peaks two years
after the shock. Unemployment begins to rise significantly 12 months after the shock.
The signs of all variables are consistent with the responses of a variety of theoretical
models (e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007) and accord well with economic intuition.
Our results are smaller than the narrative estimates found by RR for the U.S.
economy. This is true even considering the more muted effects found by Coibion
(2012) who investigates the robustness of the RR shock series. Our findings therefore
suggest the effects of monetary policy in the U.K. are of the order of magnitude found
by other VAR-based methods in the literature.
For the U.K. Dedola and Lippi (2005) also report a fall of around 0.5 per cent in
industrial production. Mountford (2005) and Mumtaz et al. (2011) find that GDP
falls by 0.6 and 0.5 per cent respectively. However, there is more disparity in the
estimated response of inflation. For example, in Dedola and Lippi (2005), the price
level rises following a monetary contraction. Below we also show a ‘price puzzle’
exists using the recursive identification methodology in a conventional VAR with
Bank Rate as the policy variable (rather than our shock). Using the new shock series
in our approach resolves this puzzle.
Most studies conducted for the U.S. and other countries also find that real activity
22The bootstrapped confidence intervals are robust to a higher number of repetition, e.g. 10,000.
23The shock returns to zero after about 24 months. The results are robust to using the alternative
price measures RPI and CPI as presented in Figure 3.11 in Appendix 3.B.
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Figure 3.3: The macroeconomic effects of a monetary policy shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to a 100 bps increase in policy target rate. VAR with industrial
production, inflation rate (RPIX12m), unemployment rate, commodity prices and our shock
measure. P=24. Sample: 1975-2007. Confidence bands indicate 68 and 95 per cent intervals.
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as measured by industrial production or total output declines between 0.5 and 1 per
cent to a 100 bps increase in the interest rate. A concise overview of selected studies
can be found in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: The effects of monetary policy shocks in previous studies
Authors Country Method Peak Effects (in %)
Output Prices/Inflation
Romer and Romer (2004) U.S. narrative -1.6 to -4.6 (IP) -5.9 (PPI Level)
Coibion (2012) U.S. narrative -2.6 (IP) -2.9 (CPI)
Dedola and Lippi (2005) U.K. VAR -0.5 (IP) 0.2 (CPI Level)
Mountford (2005) U.K. sign-restriction -0.6 (GDP) -0.15 (GDP Defl.)
Mumtaz et al. (2011) U.K. FAVAR -1.0/-2.0 (IP, 75-91/92-05) -0.3/-2 on CPI
-0.5/-0.5 (GDP,75-91/92-05) (75-91/92-05)
Bernanke and Mihov (1998) U.S. VAR -0.6 to -1 (GDP) -0.7 to -1.6 (GDP Defl.)
Christiano et al. (1999) U.S. VAR -0.7 (IP) -0.6
Bernanke et al. (2005) U.S. FAVAR -0.6 -0.7
Uhlig (2005) U.S. sign-restriction -0.8 to 0.8 -0.4
Notes: The results from previous studies listed in the table are from impulse responses displayed
in these papers. We computed implied peak effects to a 100 bps increase in the interest rate.
In brackets we report the specific output and price measure, where IP denotes industrial
production.
3.4.3 The price puzzle
Conventional VARs which employ observed interest rates and the recursive identifi-
cation strategy of Christiano et al. (1999) often generate a substantial and persistent
price puzzle — a monetary policy tightening is followed by an increase in the price
level and/or inflation rate. This observation, first documented in Sims (1992) and
dubbed the ‘price puzzle’ by Eichenbaum (1992), has raised doubts about the recursive
identification scheme, being at odds with conventional intuition and theory. A large
literature has proposed various methods to resolve this puzzle, such as expanding the
VAR with oil prices and commodity prices or to use FAVARs. The motivation behind
these approaches is that conventional VARs do not contain enough observables to
capture the information actually available to policymakers and driving the changes
in interest rates.
For the U.K. economy, we also find that a VAR with Bank Rate as the policy instru-
ment (rather than our shock) and employing the recursive identification assumption
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produces a large and persistent price and inflation puzzle.24 As a robustness check we
add a variety of variables to this VAR including commodity prices, oil prices, money
supply and various exchange rate measures. However, adding these variables does
not solve the U.K. price puzzle. Figure 3.4 shows the inflation response to a 100 bps
increase in Bank Rate in a conventional VAR (dashed line) and compares it to the
response based on our new shock series. Using the standard recursive method, the
inflation response is positive for around two years and lies outside of the 95 per cent
confidence intervals of our baseline results.
Figure 3.4: Response of inflation in VAR with the new shock measure vs. a conven-
tional, recursive VAR with Bank Rate
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Notes: Impulse responses to a 100 bps increase in policy target rate. VAR with industrial
production, inflation rate (RPIX12m), unemployment rate, commodity prices and shock
measure. P=24. Sample: 1975-2007. The circled line is the inflation response based on the new
shock measure together with the respective confidence bands. The dashed line is the inflation
response based on a conventional, recursive VAR with Bank Rate. Confidence bands indicate
68 and 95 per cent intervals.
24In our procedure, we replace Bank Rate in the VAR specification with our new monetary shock
measure.
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Romer and Romer (2004) also document a large price puzzle for the U.S. using the
conventional recursive VAR methodology and show that their new shock measure
solves this issue. It therefore seems a robust feature of both the U.S. and U.K.
that applying the narrative identification strategy resolves the puzzling results in
conventional VAR studies.
3.5 Robustness and extensions
3.5.1 Comparison to the Romer–Romer results
Earlier we estimated the effects of our new shock series using a VAR but in principle
we should also be able to estimate a single equation auto-regressive distributed lag
model. In this section we compare the effects of monetary policy shocks on the price
level and on industrial production estimating single equation regressions as in Romer
and Romer (2004). We regress each macroeconomic variable (xt) on its lags and lags
of the policy shock mt directly estimated from the first stage:
∆xt = c+
P∑
i=1
βi∆xt−i +
Q∑
j=1
γjmt−j + t . (3.5.5)
To follow Romer and Romer (2004) we assume that the shock does not contempo-
raneously affect the macroeconomic variable xt. To ensure comparability we also set
P = 24 and Q = 36 for industrial production and P = 24 and Q = 48 for the price
level. Figure 3.5 presents the impulse responses of the price level as measured by
RPIX and CPI as well as industrial production to a permanent 100 bps increase of
the policy shock. The 68 and 95 per cent confidence bands are again bootstrapped
(2,000 repetitions).
Both price measures decline significantly by up to 1.5 per cent after four years in
response to a 100 bps monetary tightening. Strikingly, compared to the peak effect
documented in Romer and Romer (2004) the U.K. price responses are smaller by
up to a factor of three. Although the effect is smaller, the dynamics are similar: a
protracted price response to a policy target rate increase which is flat and insignificant
for almost two years.
Industrial production immediately drops after the shock and reaches its minimum
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at -2.5 per cent about 30 months after the shock. Again this is less pronounced than
the U.S. results, where industrial production responds by up to -4.3 per cent. It is
noteworthy that the RR study for the U.S. finds a small output puzzle in the first five
months after the shock, which is not a feature of our results for the U.K. economy.
The single equation results, in keeping with RR, suggest larger – but qualitatively
similar – effects compared to our VAR results. However, these larger effects partly
reflect the way the impulse responses are computed. In the baseline VAR the shock
decays endogenously while in this section it is implicitly modelled as a permanent
change.25
Figure 3.5: Single equation regressions
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Notes: Impulse responses to a 100 bps increase in policy target rate. Confidence bands indicate
68 and 95 per cent intervals.
25Although it is not necessarily a permanent change in monetary policy as there may be offsetting
changes to Bank Rate in later periods. Note that these are slightly different exercises and the
responses are also affected by the implied Bank Rate path which is more persistent in the single
equation regression than in the VAR.
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3.5.2 Alternative timing assumptions
So far we have followed the previous literature (Christiano et al., 1996, 1999;
Romer and Romer, 2004; Coibion, 2012) imposing that the policy change does not
contemporaneously affect macroeconomic variables. We relax this assumption for the
following reason. The regressors in the first stage regression capture the real-time
information set of policymakers prior to the policy rate decision. As discussed, we
carefully ensure that the forecasts do not include the consequences of the policy
change. If we have correctly captured the information set that policymakers used to
form their decision, our shock measure mt should be contemporaneously exogenous.
Rather than assuming movements in policy do not contemporaneously affect other
variables in the second stage VAR, we should, in principle, be able to relax this
assumption.
We therefore estimate our baseline VAR with the shock measure ordered first in the
recursive ordering. This implies that contemporaneous macroeconomic fluctuations
do not affect the policy decision other than via the forecasts. This seems reasonable
given the discussion above. We can now identify the contemporaneous effects of our
monetary shocks.
Panel A of Figure 3.6 presents the results based on this new identification assump-
tion (blue dashed line). Our results are virtually identical, suggesting that the effects
of monetary policy are indeed very protracted, building up slowly over time.
3.5.3 Do the forecasts matter?
Previously we argued that forecasts provide summary statistics of the policymakers’
information set. Forecasts also allow us to control for policy reactions designed
to offset future business cycle movements. If policy did not respond to forecasted
conditions, or if the VAR already contains sufficient information to make their
inclusion redundant, excluding the forecasts from our first stage regression would
not alter our baseline results. To examine this possibility we estimate the first stage
regression only including lagged real-time variables. Panel B in Figure 3.6 shows the
results of this exercise. With forecasts excluded we find a substantial and pronounced
price puzzle, the unemployment response doubles and the industrial production
response is slightly stronger. These findings suggest that policymakers do respond
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Figure 3.6: Robustness to timing assumptions, excluding forecasts and quarterly GDP
data
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Notes: Impulse responses to a 100 bps increase in policy target rate (dashed line) of alternative
specification compared to baseline specification (circled line) with corresponding 68 and 95
per cent confidence intervals. The baseline specification uses industrial production, RPIX12m
inflation, unemployment rate, commodity prices, and our shock measure. Panel A: non-recursive
VAR allowing for contemporaneous effect (dashed line). Panel B: first stage regression with
only lagged variables (dashed line). Panel C: quarterly VAR with GDP.
to anticipated movements in the macroeconomy and that this information is not
adequately summarised by conventional macroeconomic variables used in VARs.
As a further experiment, we estimate the first stage regression excluding real-time
backdata and forecasts of the current period.26 Interestingly, the dynamics are very
similar to our baseline results in Section 4. It is therefore the inclusion of the forecasts
that seems key for removing the price puzzle.
In a related contribution, Castelnuovo and Surico (2010) provide compelling ev-
idence that the omission of expected inflation in a VAR can account for the price
26In practise, we estimate equation (3.2.2) with the forecast horizon i = 1, 2 instead of i = −1, 0, 1, 2.
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puzzle in indeterminate monetary regimes. In essence excluding forecasts causes
omitted variable bias and the empirical evidence for the U.K. economy in this section
is in line with their finding. That said, we find a price puzzle after 1993 as well
using a conventional recursive VAR with Bank Rate, in a regime widely regarded as
satisfying the Taylor Principle.
3.5.4 Quarterly VAR with GDP
In earlier sections we used industrial production as our measure of output. This is
useful because it is available monthly and correlates strongly with GDP. To provide
an estimate of how strongly monetary policy shocks affect the total economy, as
measured by GDP, we estimate a quarterly VAR with National Accounts data.27 In
line with our baseline results the peak decline in inflation is 0.81 percentage points
and the unemployment rate significantly build up to 0.23 percentage points (see Panel
C in Figure 3.6). GDP significantly falls below zero to a minimum of -0.36 per cent.
The effect on GDP is roughly half the size of industrial production. A smaller peak
effect on GDP as compared to industrial production is in line with the U.K. result of
Mumtaz et al. (2011).28
3.5.5 Expanding the first stage: money supply and exchange
rates
Although inflation targeting has been the stable policy regime since 1993, there have
been a number of other experiments since 1975. Monetary targeting was emphasised
in the early 1980s and stricter control of the money supply had begun in the late
1970s. In addition, during the latter half of the 1980s the U.K. began shadowing the
Deutsche Mark as a forerunner to the U.K. joining the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism, which it then was forced to leave in 1992.
Batini and Nelson (2009) argue that short-term interest rates have consistently
been used as the policy instrument even throughout these earlier periods of U.K.
monetary policy. Nonetheless, to examine whether these extra objectives affected the
27We include GDP, RPIX, unemployment rate and our shock measure cumulated to a quarterly
series.
28It is worth noting that we also find a price puzzle using quarterly data in a conventional recursive
VAR with Bank Rate.
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Figure 3.7: Robustness to including extra first stage regressors and using NIESR
forecasts
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Notes: Impulse responses to a 100 bps increase in policy target rate (dashed line) of alternative
specification compared to baseline specification (circled line) with corresponding 68 and 95
per cent confidence intervals. The baseline specification uses industrial production, RPIX12m
inflation, unemployment rate, commodity prices, and our shock measure. Panel A: first stage
regression includes lagged money supply M0, US Dollar-Sterling exchange rate, DM (Euro)-
Sterling exchange rate (dashed line). Panel B: using only NIESR forecasts (dashed line) in first
stage regression.
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setting of the policy target rate, we expand the variables in the first stage regression
to include lagged money supply (M0) as well as the US Dollar-Sterling exchange
rate and the Deutsche Mark/Euro-Sterling exchange rate.29 Panel A of Figure 3.7
shows that our baseline results are largely unaffected by the inclusions of these extra
variables.
3.5.6 Private sector forecasts
A possible concern is whether NIESR forecasts (for periods where official forecasts
were unavailable) are suitable substitutes for official forecasts. Ideally we would
like to have used official forecasts for the full sample, but these were unavailable
further back. Previously we noted that NIESR and Bank of England forecasts are
highly correlated at short forecast horizons. Moreover, if private sector forecasts are
a good proxy for official forecasts we should expect very similar results using NIESR
forecasts in our first stage regression for the full sample. To investigate the validity of
employing private forecasts, we estimate the first stage regression using only NIESR
data (blue dashed line). Panel B in Figure 3.7 shows that the impulse responses based
on NIESR data for the full sample are almost identical and lie well within the 95 per
cent confidence bands of our baseline results (solid line). The results are virtually
unchanged suggesting that NIESR forecasts are a valid proxy for the policymakers’
information set.
3.5.7 Monetary policy since the inflation targeting regime
Since October 1992 the U.K. has operated an inflation targeting regime. Earlier we
showed that the volatility of our monetary policy shock series is much smaller after
the early 1990s. In this subsection we examine the effects of monetary policy for the
post-1992 sample.
Figure 3.8 shows that in response to a 100 bps increase in the policy target rate,
the inflation rate falls by up to 0.43 percentage points. Industrial production exhibits
a peak decline of 1.53 per cent and a rise in unemployment rate of 0.40 percentage
29Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) estimate policy rules for several countries, among these for the
U.K. economy, and include the Sterling-Deutsche Mark exchange rate as a relevant regressor.
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Figure 3.8: The effects of monetary policy under inflation targeting
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Notes: Impulse responses to a 100 bps increase in policy target rate. VAR with industrial
production, inflation rate (RPIX12m), unemployment rate, commodity prices and our shock
measure. P=12. Sample: 1993-2007. Confidence bands indicate 68 and 95 per cent intervals.
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points.30 The following differences stand out when comparing the results to the
full sample findings. Inflation begins to fall nine months after the shock, rather
than 18 months in our baseline results. Furthermore, after two years the effect on
inflation returns back to zero. Similar to before, the real effects on unemployment and
industrial production begin to materialize about 15 to 18 months after the increase
in policy target rate. The real effects in a quarterly VAR are similar to our previous
results. For the post-92 sample the peak effect of GDP is -0.3 per cent and is only
slightly smaller than for the full sample (see Figure 3.6).
Quantitatively the response of industrial production is around two and a half times
larger in the post-1992 sample, with unemployment twice as large, but the inflation
response is half the magnitude. Consistent with Mumtaz et al. (2011) we find a more
pronounced effect of industrial production in response to a monetary policy shock
after 1992. However, our results — and those of Mumtaz et al. (2011) — suggest
moderate GDP effects that are similar pre- and post-1992. Although our peak effect
on inflation is smaller than their results, they do also find that a fall in inflation is
quicker in the more recent sub-sample. One interpretation of the faster response for
inflation might be that inflation targeting regimes are tougher at controlling inflation
in the aftermath of an expansionary shock to monetary policy. The faster fall in
prices may also reflect changes in price and wage setting behaviour since the 1980s.
3.6 Conclusion
Identifying exogenous variation in monetary policy is challenging. This chapter
tackles this issue for the U.K. by applying the identification strategy of Romer and
Romer (2004). While numerous studies employ more conventional VAR methodologies,
to our knowledge, there has been no other application of this so-called narrative
strategy to corroborate the large effects found for the U.S. economy. Moreover, there
is comparatively little evidence of the macroeconomic effects of monetary policy for
the U.K. economy.
The U.K. is an excellent country to conduct this new study: the Bank of England’s
policy rate is the intended target rate and there is a wealth of U.K. real-time and
30In comparison, the recursive VAR with Bank Rate yields a persistent price puzzle with a peak
effect of 0.5 percentage points.
126
3.6 Conclusion
forecast data available. We construct a new, extensive real-time forecast database and
carefully match these data to relevant Bank Rate decision. We therefore reconstruct
the policymakers’ information set prior to the policy change, allowing us to identify
monetary policy shocks from a first stage regression.
Armed with our new shock measure we find moderate effects of monetary policy
on the macroeconomy. A 100 basis point tightening leads to a maximum decline in
output of 0.6 per cent and a fall in inflation of 0.8 percentage points after two to
three years. Monetary policy changes have a protracted effect on the economy, with
little initial impact. Our results also suggest that GDP responds less than industrial
production — around 0.4 per cent at peak in response to a contractionary monetary
policy shock.
Our findings are more in line with conventional VAR evidence than with the large
effects Romer and Romer (2004) and Coibion (2012) find for the U.S. economy. That
said, in keeping with RR, we are able to resolve the price puzzle for the U.K. — a key
challenge of common recursive identification approaches. We show that the narrative
approach employed here, in particular the use of forecast data, is crucial for this
result.
The effect of changes in monetary policy continues to be keenly debated, both in
academic and policy circles. In addition, it seems likely that interest rates will remain
a key instrument of monetary policy as economies recover from the Great Recession.
Our new estimates therefore contribute to this ongoing debate. By conducting the
narrative approach this chapter provides a rich new data set as well as a monetary
policy shock measure of the U.K. economy. We hope both will provide exciting scope
for future research.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
3.A Data appendix
Table 3.5: Data sources
Variable Source Description Series
Output ONS GDP seasonally adjusted
(S.A.)
ABMI
Industrial production ONS Covers manufacturing, mining
and quarrying and energy sup-
ply (S.A.)
CKYW
Inflation (RPIX) ONS Annual change in Retail Price
Index excluding mortgage in-
terest payments
CHMK
Inflation (RPI) ONS Annual change in Retail Price
Index
CHAW
Inflation (CPI) ONS Annual change in Consumer
Price Index
D7BT
Interest rates Bank of England Bank Rate / Minimum Lend-
ing Rate / Repo Rate / Official
Bank Rate
“Official Bank
Rate history”
Unemployment rate ONS Unemployment rate (Age 16
and over). Claimant count and
ILO measure (S.A.)
MGSX
Money supply M0 Bank of England Monthly average amount out-
standing of total sterling notes
and coin in circulation, exclud-
ing backing assets for commer-
cial banknote issue in Scotland
and Northern Ireland (S.A.)
LPMAVAB
Exchange rates Sterling/USD Bank of England Spot exchange rate, USD into
Sterling (monthly average)
XUMAUSS
Exchange rates Sterling/Euro Bundesbank Spot exchange rate Euro into
Sterling (monthly average)
BBK01.WT5627
Exchange rates Sterling/DM Bundesbank Spot exchange rate DM into
Sterling (monthly average)
BBK01.WT5005
Effective exchange rates Bank of England IMF-based effective exchange
rate index (1975-2006), there-
after effective exchange rate in-
dex. (monthly average, S.A.).
XUMABK82,
XUMAGBG
Commodity price index IMF IMF Commodity price index
converted to Sterling (S.A.)
128
3.A Data appendix
Table 3.6: Variables of real-time forecasts data set
Variable Source Description Available period
Real GDP growth IR Annualised quarterly real GDP growth
rates (S.A.)
1997-08
RPIX IR Annual RPIX inflation rate 1993-03
HCPI IR Annual HCPI inflation rate 2003-08
Real GDP growth NIESR Annualised quarterly real GDP growth
rates (S.A.)
1975-08
RPI/RPIX NIESR Annual RPIX inflation rate 1987-08
HCPI NIESR Annual HCPI inflation rate 1999-08
GDP Deflator NIESR Annualised quarterly GDP deflator 1987-08
Consumer price defl. NIESR Annualised quarterly consumer price
deflator
1975-89
Effective exchange rate NIESR Annualised quarterly exchange rate
growth rate
1975-08
Unemployment rate NIESR Annual unemployment rate (ILO rate
after 98Q3) (S.A.)
1987-08
Trade Balance/GDP NIESR Trade balance-GDP ratio (S.A.) 1992-08
Notes: If available we collected up to eight quarters forecasts and eight quarters backdata
amounting to 17 observations for each variable including the real-time estimate of the contem-
poraneous quarter.
Figure 3.9: Real-time and revised data for annualised real GDP growth
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3.B Further results
Figure 3.10: Cumulated shock series and actual Bank Rate
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Notes: Exogenous Bank Rate path is the cumulated shock series adjusted for the average Bank
Rate.
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Figure 3.11: Robustness to alternative price measures and lag length
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Notes: Impulse responses to a 100 bps increase in policy target rate (dashed line) of alternative
specification compared to baseline specification (circled line) with corresponding 68 and 95
per cent confidence intervals. The baseline specification uses industrial production, RPIX12m
inflation, unemployment rate, commodity prices, and our shock measure. Panel A compares
the dynamics for various inflation measures (RPI and CPI) to the baseline VAR with RPIX.
Panel B provides the baseline VAR results compared to including 12 and 36 lags.
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